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III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78A-3-l 02(3)(j). The case was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-l 03(2)(j).
IV. ST A TEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah

and Ouray Reservation ("Tribe") is a necessary and indispensable party as to causes of
action which are state law claims brought against Tribal officials for ultra vires acts as
well as other parties who are not affiliated with the Tribe, which occurred outside of Ute
Tribal land and within the State of Utah?
The standard for review is an abuse of discretion standard. See Seftel v. Capital

City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Although not necessary to preserve
this issue, this issue was preserved in the trial court. R. 198-200, 203-217, 259-272.
B.

Did the trial court err in not concluding that the state's interests in

promoting fair and competitive business activity free from unlawful interference from
foreign powers, by protecting non-Indian state residents, who compose roughly 95% of
the area population, state small businesses, and the oil and gas industry, which is the
lifeblood of the local economy, outweigh the interests of the Tribe in regulating nonIndian business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land, the
jurisdiction of the Tribe, and within the jurisdiction of the State of Utah?
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This is a jurisdictional issue and the standard for review is under a correction of
error standard. The trial court's ruling is given no deference. Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT
App 199, 17, 29 P.3d 13. This issue was preserved in the trial court. R. 1483-1499.

C.

Did the trial court err in granting the Utah R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to

dismiss filed by various defendants?
The standard for review is under a correction of error standard. The trial court's
ruling is given no deference. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811
P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) (cited authorities omitted).
As it relates to the tort of extortion, the trial court found as a matter of law that the
State of Utah does not recognize this cause of action. This issue of first impression
presents a question of law and the trial court is given no deference. Id. These issues
were preserved in the trial court. R. 664-685, 689-703.
D.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the tribal officials are immune

from suit, where the conduct complained of violates state law, occurred outside of Ute
Tribal land within the State of Utah, and outside the jurisdiction of the Tribe?
This is a jurisdictional issue and the standard for review is under a correction of
error standard. The trial court's ruling is given no deference. Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT
App 199, t7. This issue was preserved in the trial court. R. 1151-1179.

E.

Did the trial court err in finding that the Tribe did not waive sovereign

immunity, by making a general appearance in state court and seeking affirmative relief
from the state court beyond a dismissal on the grounds of jurisdiction?
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The standard for review is under a correction of error standard and the trial court's
ruling is given no deference. State v. Reber, 2007 UT 36 'fl8, 171 P.3d 406. This issue
was preserved in the trial court. R. 1458-1465

F.

Did the trial court err by not allowing supplemental pleadings, where

Plaintiffs/Appellants sought leave to plead supplemental facts which did not occur until
well after the complaint was drafted and during periods the action was stayed in state
court?
A Utah R. of Civ. P. 15( d) motion is "addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, and leave to serve a supplemental pleading 'should be liberally granted unless good
reason exists for denying leave."' Sw. Nurseries, LLC v. Florists Mut. Ins., Inc., 266 F.
Supp. 2d 1253, 1256, (D. Colo. 2003) (quoted authority omitted). "Refusing leave to
amend is generally only justified upon a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the
opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, or futility of amendment." Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357,
1365 (10th Cir. 1993). This issue was preserved in the trial court. R. 1469-1482.

V. STATEMENT OF STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

1.

OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Utah R. of Civ. P. 19:
Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.

See Aplt. Addendum Page 2
2.

UT AH CONST. art. XII § 19 [Blacklisting forbidden]

Each person in Utah isfree to obtain and enjoy employment
whenever possible, and a person or c01poration, or their agent,
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servant, or employee may not maliciously inte1fere with any person
from obtaining employment or enjoying employment already
obtained from any other person or corporation.
3.

UTAH CONST. art. XVI § 4 [Exchange of blacklists prohibited]

The exchange of black lists by rai /road companies, or other
corporations, associations or persons is prohibited.
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs filed suit in the trial court asserting several state law claims, including
tortious interference with economic relations, extortion, unlawful restraint of trade,
blacklisting and civil conspiracy against Defendants Cesspooch, LaR.ose and Wopsock,
as well as other defendants, who were added in the amended complaint, including
Newfield Exploration Company, Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC,
L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc. Scamp Excavation, Inc., Huffman Enterprises, Inc.,
LaRose Construction Company, Inc., and D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. Plaintiffs' relief
requested included a request for declaratory judgment that "the assertion of Tribal
jurisdiction as a defense to Plaintiffs' claims is unavailing, as the Tribe lacks jurisdiction"
over certain land categories set forth in the pleading.
On September 20, 2013, the Tribe removed the case to federal court. Following
the filing of the removal notice, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting remand to the state
court. On July 1, 2014, the Federal District Court granted Plaintiffs' motion (the
"Remand Order"). The Tribe appealed the Remand Order to the 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals. By opinion entered August 13, 2015, the Remand Order was upheld. The trial
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court granted motions to dismiss filed by various Defendants resulting in the dismissal of
all of Plaintiffs' claims on May 12, 2016.

A.

FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Procedural Facts

The Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Original
Complaint") was filed by Plaintiffs in this matter on April 5, 2013. R. 1-21. The Original
Complaint identified four Defendants ( collectively referred to as the "Initial
Defendants"), the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (the "Tribe"),
Dino Cesspooch, individually and as a Ute Tribal Employment Rights Office ("UTERO")
Commissioner, Jackie LaRose, individually and as a UTERO Commissioner, and Sheila
Wopsock, individually and as the UTERO Director. R. 1-21.
The complaint sought declaratory judgment with respect to the Tribe's and tribal
official's exercise of authority over non-Indians in certain categories ofland. R. 1-21.
The complaint then alleged two state law causes of action, tortious interference with
economic relations and extortion, against the tribal officials for their ultra vires actions
which damaged Plaintiffs. R. 1-21.
On May 1, 2013, J. Preston Stieff filed an Entry of Special Appearance and a
motion to dismiss the complaint on behalf of the Initial Defendants. R. 198-200, 203-217.
The Initial Defendants asserted four basic arguments to support dismissal, including that
the court lacked jurisdiction due to insufficient process and insufficient service of
process, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of a valid waiver of
sovereign immunity, the court lacked jurisdiction over necessary and indispensable
Page 5 of 54
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parties, and the court lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. R. 203-217.
The Initial Defendants requested that the state court interpret and make
conclusions of law related to the issue of sovereign immunity. R. 203-217. This included
requests that the state court analyze and interpret the waiver provisions of the UTERO
Ordinance, and the Law and Order Code of the Ute Indian Tribe. R. 203-217. Affidavits
were presented to the state couti and it was requested that the state court dismiss the case
based on the "facts and legal authorities" cited in the memorandum supporting the motion
to dismiss. R. 218-220, 203-217.
The Initial Defendants also filed two motions requesting pro hac vice admission
for two attorneys for the Tribe. R. 398-400, 405-407 and those motions were granted by
respective orders on June 11, 2013. R. 419-422. On July 8, 2013, Patrick Boice filed his
Notice of Substitution of Counsel, for Defendants Cesspooch, LaRose and Wopsock. R.
427-428.
Plaintiffs filed their motion requesting leave to amend the complaint on July 17,
2013. R. 431-435. The amended complaint ("Amended Complaint") seeks a declaration
that "the assertion of Tribal jurisdiction as a defense to Plaintiffs' claims is unavailing, as
the Tribe lacks jurisdiction" over certain land categories set forth in the amended
complaint, and then asserts several state law claims, including tortious interference with
economic relations, extortion, unlawful restraint of trade, blacklisting and civil
conspiracy against Defendants Cesspooch, LaRose and W opsock, as well as other
Defendants, who were added in the Amended Complaint, including Newfield Exploration
Page 6 of 54
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Company, Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC, L.C. Welding &
Construction, Inc., Scamp Excavation, Inc., Huffman Enterprises, Inc., LaRose
Construction Company, Inc. and D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. R. 548-579.
Not all Defendants are implicated in each cause of action and no causes of action
are asserted against the Tribe other than defensive declaratory relief nor are any damages
sought from the Tribe pursuant to the Amended Complaint. R. 548-579. The sole relief
sought respecting the Tribe is defensive declaratory relief that assertion of Tribal
jurisdiction in certain land categories outside the jurisdiction of the Tribe does not defeat
Plaintiffs' state law claims against the other parties. R. 548-579.
On July 22, 2013, the state court held the hearing on the Initial Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss. The parties argued every element of the motion, including issues as to
service, sovereign immunity, indispensable parties and exhaustion of administrative
remedies. R. 198-200, 203-217. In terms of service, the Tribe argued, among other
things, that service of process on the Tribe would need to be completed through the Ute
Tribal Court, that all six (6) members of the Business Committee (the governing body of
the Tribe) must be served, that the summons and complaint must be domesticated by the
Ute Tribal Court and that the Ute Tribal Court must be petitioned to authorize service. R.
371-379.
The state court rendered a partial decision rejecting the Tribe's argument as to
service requirements on the Tribe, by allowing service by mail on the Tribe and
Defendant Wopsock. R. 508-507. Defendants Cesspooch and LaRose had already been
personally served in May 2013.
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The court also afforded all parties the opportunity to brief the issue of whether the
Initial Defendants had made a general appearance rather than a special appearance by
including items other than service issues in their motion to dismiss. The parties were
allowed until August 2, 2013 to brief the issue. R. 508-511. Plaintiffs, the Tribe, and
Defendants Cesspooch, LaRose and Wopsock subsequently briefed the issue and it was
pending before the trial court at the time of the removal to federal court. R. 484-490, 493495, 498-499. At the July hearing, the trial court then took the remaining issues under
advisement.
The Initial Defendants did not oppose the motion to amend the complaint, and, on
August 16, 2013, the state court entered its order permitting the amending of the
complaint. R. 519-520. The Amended Complaint was served on Defendants, and returns
were filed with the state court. R. 526-530, 533-536, 537-544, 582-603, 607-618, 622625.
The Tribe filed a notice of removal on September 20, 2013. R. 629-636. Plaintiffs
then filed a motion requesting remand to the state court. In granting remand, the federal
court observed that "th[ e] defendants ... submitted and argued a nearly identical motion
to dismiss in th[at] [c ]ourt as the motion originally filed and argued before the state
court." R. 648-655. The court further opined, "Thus, it seems defendants held nothing
back in an effort to dispose of the matter in the first instance before the state court." R.
648-655.
Defendants appealed the Remand Order to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Defendants also filed a motion in the state court to stay the action. On October 9, 2014,
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the action was stayed by the trial court during the pend ency of the appeal of the Remand
Order. R. 738-742, 895-900. By opinion entered August 13, 2015, the Remand Order was
upheld. R. 1031-104 7. The trial court granted motions to dismiss filed by various
defendants resulting in the dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims on March 28, 2016. R.
1757-1794.

2.

Facts Pleaded in Amended Complaint

The Amended Complaint consists of 33 pages. The following is a summary of the
facts alleged and assumed true for purposes of the Utah R. of Civ. P. 12 motions granted
by the district court and relevant to the issues on appeal.
Plaintiffs are persons and corporations domiciled in and doing business in
Duchesne and Uintah Counties. R. 549-550. Plaintiffs provide dirt, sand, and gravel
products, and lease heavy equipment (the ''Products"). R. 553-554. Plaintiffs' business
activities do not require them to access or even pass through Ute Tribal land, with
operations confined to fee land outside of Ute Tribal land as defined under Hagen v.

Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994). R. 553-554.
The Tribe is a federally recognized tribe with reservation lands located in
Duchesne and Uintah Counties. Defendant Dino Cesspooch ("Commissioner Cesspooch"
or "Cesspooch") is an appointed UTERO Commissioner, and is sued in his individual as
well as his official capacity. R. 550. Defendant Jackie LaRose ("Commissioner LaRose"
or "LaRose") is an appointed UTERO Commissioner, and is sued in his individual as
well as his official capacity. R. 550. Defendant Sheila Wopsock ("Director Wopsock" or
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"Wopsock") is the appointed Director of the UTERO Commission, and is sued in her
individual as well as her official capacity. R. 550.
Defendants, Newfield Production Company and Newfield Rocky Mountain, Inc.
are Delaware corporations, Defendant Newfield RMI, LLC is a Delaware limited liability
company, and Defendant Newfield Drilling Services Inc. is a Utah corporation, and all of
these entities (referred to collectively herein as "Newfield") are under common
ownership and control, and are engaged in the exploration, development and production
of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids with production regions, employees,
operations, and doing business in Duchesne and Uintah Counties. R. 550-551.
Defendant L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc. ("L.C. Welding") is a Utah
corporation. R. 551. Defendant Scamp Excavation, Inc. ("Scamp") is a Utah corporation.
R. 5 51. Defendant Huffman Enterprises, Inc. ("Huffman") is a Utah corporation. R. 5 51.
Defendant LaRose Construction Company, Inc. ("LaRose Construction") is a Utah
corporation. R. 551. Defendant D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. ("D.Ray Enterprises") is a
Utah limited liability company. R. 552. All of these entities, like Newfield do business in
Utah and are subject to jurisdiction in Utah. R. 550-552.
Duchesne and Uintah Counties are located in Utah's Uintah Basin. R. 552. The
major economic force of the Uintah Basin is the oil and gas industry. R. 552. A majority
of the revenue earned by Plaintiffs is generated by providing the Products to oil and gas
companies. R. 553.
There are approximately 54,000 residents of Uintah and Duchesne Counties. R.
552. The Uintah and Ouray Reservation of the Ute Indian Tribe is located within the
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Uintah Basin. R. 552. There are approximately 3,000 enrolled members of the Tribe. R.
553.
Since in or about September 2012, Cesspooch has harassed, threatened, bullied,
and intimidated Plaintiffs by threatening to utilize his position as a UTERO
Commissioner to "shut down" Plaintiffs' businesses if UTERO certification was not
obtained. R. 554. Cesspooch's threats subjected Plaintiffs to duress because oil and gas
companies, including Newfield, have" ... cooperated with and assisted Cesspooch by
refusing work and to do business with companies similar to Plaintiffs' ... " effectively
putting these companies out of business. R. 554.
Plaintiffs explained that their business operations were confined to private fee land
and that they do not access or even travel through Ute Tribal land in their business
operations. R. 554-555. Despite this, Cesspooch persisted in and escalated his threats,
including threats to impound Plaintiffs' heavy equipment that was located on private fee
land, not within Ute Tribal land. R. 555. Under duress and in an effort to save their
businesses, Plaintiffs obtained UTERO Certification in or about November 2012. R. 555556.
Even after UTERO Certification was obtained, Cesspooch persisted in his threats.
R. 556. Plaintiffs were accosted by Cesspooch at the China Star Restaurant located in
Roosevelt, Utah. R. 556. Cesspooch claimed his signature on certification documents
issued to Plaintiffs were no good and his signature had been forged. R. 556. At a later
meeting at another restaurant in Roosevelt, Cesspooch did an about-face and informed
Plaintiffs that their UTERO Certification was good. R. 557.
Page 11 of 54

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In February 2013, while Plaintiffs were traveling on Highway 40 in Roosevelt,
they were forced to pull over by Cesspooch into a local business parking lot located
within Roosevelt. R. 557-558. Cesspooch then attempted to extort Plaintiffs. R. 557-558.
A short time after Plaintiffs refused Cesspooch's extortionist demands, Director
Wopsock sent correspondence accusing Plaintiffs of submitting false and inaccurate
official tribal, state and federal documents. R. 558. On March 20, 2015, Wopsock
demanded that all oil and gas companies cease doing business with Plaintiffs. R. 558.
Wopsock's demands were not limited to Ute Tribal lands. R. 558.
Newfield cooperated and complied with Wopsock's directives and, by email dated
March 22, 2013, informed Plaintiffs that it would no longer utilize their Products. R. 558.
This was not limited to business conducted on Ute Tribal land, R. 558, and the situs of
Plaintiffs' business operations is exclusively outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 554-555.
Newfield has also refused to do business with any third party who utilizes Plaintiffs'
Products. R. 559. Newfield has informed Plaintiffs that it will not do business with
Plaintiffs or work with anyone who does business with Plaintiffs based on their
cooperation with the UTERO officials. 1 R. 559. Newfield's cooperation with the
unlawful and ultra vires actions of tribal officials in blacklisting and boycotting Plaintiffs
is the direct and proximate cause of substantial damages to Plaintiffs. R. 559. Plaintiffs
discussed this matter with Cesspooch who was unable to provide Plaintiffs with a single

1

UTERO officials and tribal officials arc used interchangeably throughout this brief.
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reason why the UTERO officials te1minated Plaintiffs' businesses, and had Plaintiffs
blacklisted and boycotted by the local oil and gas industry. R. 559.
Cesspooch has threatened third parties that he would "shut down" their businesses
if they leased any equipment from Plaintiffs. R. 560. Nelson Construction, Inc. informed
Plaintiffs that Wopsock demanded that they not utilize Plaintiffs' rock crushing
equipment that is located on private ground that is not on Ute Tribal land. R. 560.
UTERO officials have engaged in a pattern and practice of extorting money from
area businesses by threatening to "shut down" their operations if the businesses do not
pay the UTERO officials. R. 560. For example, Cesspooch, a convicted felon, has
demanded 10% of area businesses' gross revenues in return for "keep[ing] them working
and UTERO compliant." R. 560. UTERO officials dictate to oil and gas companies which
contractors will be awarded bids and which contractors are not to be used. R. 561. These
directives are not limited to work performed on Ute Tribal land, and have resulted in
substantial harm to Plaintiffs' enterprises outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 562.
LaRose, at all relevant times, owned an interest in an oil & gas service company,
LaRose Construction. R. 561. LaRose received bribes and work from Huffman, a
competitor of Plaintiffs, in exchange for LaRose's abusing his position as a UTERO
Commissioner and wrongfully diverting business from Plaintiffs to Huffman. R. 561.
LaRose, L.C. Welding, and Scamp conspired to receive an economic interest in a sand
and gravel pit located outside of tribal land which commenced operation after Plaintiffs
were "shut down" by Wopsock, Cesspooch, and LaRose. R. 561. Wopsock, Cesspooch,
and LaRose conspired to abuse their UTERO positions to destroy Plaintiffs' businesses in
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an effort to eliminate competition and because Plaintiffs refused to pay Cesspooch's
extortionist demands. R. 562. LaRose Construction and D.Ray Enterprises participated in
the conspiracy and derived a substantial economic benefit by eliminating Plaintiffs as a
competitor of the aforementioned sand and gravel pit. R. 571.
Defendants conspired together and acted with improper purpose and/or through
improper means with said action exceeding the limits of the jurisdiction the Ute Tribe. R.
568. This was done to promote Defendants' own business interests resulting in injury to
Plaintiffs. R. 568. Defendants intentionally and maliciously engaged in a conspiracy for
the purpose of causing damage to Plaintiffs and obtained unlawful financial gain. R. 573.
All acts and occurrences complained of in the Amended Complaint occurred on fee land
outside of Ute Tribal land as defined under Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (I 994). R. 562.
3.

Supplemental Facts

Plaintiffs sought to supplement the facts set forth in the Amended Complaint
pursuant to Utah R. of Civ. P. 15(d). These allegations relate to events that occurred
during the lengthy period the matter was stayed while on appeal to the I 0th Circuit, and
are summarized below.
Newfield demanded on numerous occasions that no subcontractors utilize the
Plaintiffs' Products. R. 1476-1480. Newfield threatened that any subcontractors found
utilizing Plaintiffs' Products would be prohibited from doing subcontract work for
Newfield. R. 1476.
Plaintiffs' sand and gravel pits were located where the Products could be
transported to Newfield oil and gas production locations for less than competitors, and,
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after transferring a sand and gravel pit lease to a third party lessee, Newfield began
purchasing products from that lessee. R. 1476-1477. UTERO officials and employees
have continued to threaten and harass any third party seen leaving a sand and gravel pit
operated by Plaintiffs, this harassment has taken place on county roads located non-Tribal
land and threats include blacklisting any third party seen leaving Plaintiffs' sand and
gravel pits. R. 1477. The threats are made regardless of whether the Products are to be
used by oil and gas production companies or for private projects on non-Tribal land,
county, city or state projects, and the threats and harassment have resulted in Plaintiffs
losing sales. R. 1477-1478. For example, C&R Crane was blacklisted by UTERO
officials, with the aid and cooperation of oil and gas production companies such as
Newfield, after one of C&R Crane's employees was harassed and threatened by tribal
officials after leaving one of Plaintiffs' pits. R. 1478.
Kaufusi Excavating, an excavation company, was not allowed to bid on work for
Newfield after being blacklisted by UTERO Officials for leasing Plaintiffs' equipment.
In a Newfield bid walk that occurred in December of 2015, the only companies allowed
by Newfield to bid on the project were Defendants LaRose Construction, Huffman, and

L.C. Welding. R. 1478. Defendants have been effective in eliminating competition. R.
1478-1479.
A private investigative firm commissioned by the Tribe submitted a report
confirming that UTERO Officials, acting ultra vires, have made unlawful monetary
demands on local small businesses, like Plaintiffs, catering to the oil and gas industry. R.
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1479. Cesspooch and LaRose have obstructed investigations and some Defendants' files
have been removed from the UTERO office. R. 14 79.
On January 8, 2015, the Tribe sent UTERO demands to all employers "engaging
in commercial or employment activity within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation" that non-Indians must first be terminated if there is any reduction in
the employer's workforce. R. 1480. This demand is made of companies, including
Plaintiffs, that operate within exterior boundaries but outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 1480.

VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Tribe is not a necessary or indispensable party as to lawsuits brought to

enjoin ultra vi res acts of tribal officials that violate state law and occur outside of Ute
Tribal land. This matter involves tribal officials in extorting and blacklisting Plaintiffs,
and engaging in other noncompetitive measures. It is not a critical interest of the Tribe to
facilitate such acts, especially where those acts occur outside of Ute Tribal land. Indeed,
attempting to regulate business activities which occur outside of Ute Tribal land has
nothing to do with protecting the Tribe's self-governance, and these activities are clearly
within the purview of local, state, and federal bodies, not the Tribe.

2.

The State of Utah's interest in promoting fair and competitive business

activity outweighs the interest of the Tribe in regulating non-Indian business activities
that occur within the state, and outside of Ute Tribal land. Allowing tribal officials to
regulate businesses outside of Ute Tribal land results in enterprises operating exclusively
intrastate being subjected to regulatory control by a foreign power, and infringes upon the
jurisdiction of the state.
Page 16 of 54

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

The allegations set forth in the 32-page Amended Complaint provide

sufficient notice to meet the elements of the tortious interference claim, including that
Newfield assisted tribal officials in unlawfully boycotting and blacklisting Plaintiffs, and
threatening to similarly blacklist third parties who chose to do business with Plaintiffs.
The alleged purposes of this activity were to eliminate competitors of the official's own
businesses or those of their benefactors and to retaliate against Plaintiffs for their refusal
to be extorted. The unlawful threats would have been meaningless but for Newfield's
assistance in enforcing them against Plaintiffs.
4.

Utah's recognition of a cause of action for extortion is a matter of first

impression. Currently, several causes of action exist for claims akin to extortion,
including an individual's right to sue for losses caused by theft, and the Court should
recognize a private cause of action for extortion.
5.

The Amended Complaint is clear that the arrangement between tribal

officials and Newfield was an unlawful restraint of trade, was not limited to Ute Tribal
land, and included conduct against Plaintiffs as well as third parties. Plaintiffs allege per

se violations of Utah antitrust laws, including unlawful boycotting and bid rigging, and
the Amended Complaint is not only sufficient but detailed.
6.

In rejecting the blacklisting claim, the trial court reasoned that Newfield

followed the direction ofUTERO by not using Plaintiffs for work completed on Tribal
land. This finding misapprehends the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, which are that Plaintiffs'
business operations are conducted exclusively outside of Tribal land. Moreover, Newfield
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cooperated with UTERO officials in blacklisting Plaintiffs and third parties who were
doing business with Plaintiffs.
7.

The Amended Complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish the elements

of civil conspiracy. As enumerated therein, UTERO officials asked Newfield to
discontinue using Plaintiffs' Products or third-parties who utilized Plaintiffs' Products,
and Newfield assisted tribal officials in committing their tortious and illegal activities.
8.

Defendants D.Ray Enterprises and Larose Construction participated in the

conspiracy in order to eliminate Plaintiffs as a competitor and to retaliate for Plaintiffs'
refusal to be extorted. The state court has jurisdiction over these Defendants for their

ultra vi res acts in violation of state law, which occurred within the State of Utah and
outside of Ute Tribal land.
9.

Abundant precedent provides that tribal officials are liable in state court for

damages for ultra vires acts even though a tribe may have sovereign immunity. The tribal
officials' wrongful conduct outside of Ute Tribal land is beyond the jurisdiction and valid
authority of the Ute Tribe, and, thus, the tribal officials have no immunity from suit.

I 0.

While it is an issue of first impression in Utah, persuasive authority

provides that when a tribe seeks affirmative relief from a state or federal court, the tribe
waives sovereign immunity. In addition to invoking sovereign immunity on behalf of the
Tribe, the Tribe sought dismissal of the entire case, contending the Tribe is a necessary
and indispensable party, invited the trial court to interpret provisions of the UTERO
Ordinance in consideration of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and filed for a stay.

Page 18 of 54

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The state court must necessarily have jurisdiction to grant the affirmative relief the Tribe
requested, and the Tribe waived sovereign immunity.
11.

Permitting Plaintiffs to file the supplemental pleading in this matter would

not have caused undue delay or prejudice, and should have been granted by the trial court.
This is especially true where the wrongs complained of are continuing and occurred
during the lengthy period the action was stayed by the trial court, at Defendants' behest.

VIII. ARGUMENT
A.

The trial court erred in concluding that the Tribe is a necessary and

indispensable party, as to causes of action which are state law claims brought
against Tribal officials for ultra vires acts as well as other parties who are not
affiliated with the Tribe, which occurred outside of Ute Tribal land and within the
State of Utah, leaving Plaintiffs with no recourse.
Utah R. of Civ. P. l 9(a) requires the joinder of necessary parties. To determine
whether a party is necessary, a court should consider the two general factors in rule 19(a).
First, a party is necessary if in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties. Utah R. Civ. P. l 9(a) (1 ). Second, a party is necessary if he claims
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interes . Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990). "The burden of
presenting specific facts and reasoning that lead to the conclusion that a party is a
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necessary or indispensable pa11y is on the party attempting to persuade the court that
parties are necessary." Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119,,
38, 208 P.3d 1077 (cited authority omitted).
In granting the Tribe's motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the Tribe is a
necessary and indispensable party under Utah R. of Civ. P. 19, opining, "The inquiry is
whether the Tribe claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in its absence may as a practical matter impair or impede
its ability to protect that interest." R. 1767. The trial court found that the ability to issue
the "directives" at issue is a "critical interest of the Tribe". R. 1768.
The said directives are mandates that oil and gas production companies, including
Newfield, refuse to do business with Plaintiffs, R. 558, even though Plaintiffs operate
outside of Ute Tribal land and their Products are used outside of Ute Tribal land, R. 55355, and, further, that Newfield refuse to do business with any third party doing business
with Plaintiffs. R. 559. As reiterated throughout the Amended Complaint, not only do the
business activities at issue take place outside of Ute Tribal land, generally, R. 548-579,
but the purpose for the directives was to punish Plaintiffs for refusing to pay Tribal
officials' extortionist demands. R. 558, 569. Additionally, the directives are not limited to
a prohibition against use of Plaintiffs' Products on tribal ground. R. 553.
The trial court's analysis that the regulated conduct occurred on Ute Tribal land
conflicts with the facts set forth throughout the Amended Complaint. Generally, R. 548579. The directives are a blanket blacklist/boycott of Plaintiffs regardless of the location
where the Products may be used. It is not a "critical interest" of the Tribe to facilitate
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Tribal officials' extortion of businesses that operate exclusively outside of Ute Tribal
land or to regulate Products that are utilized outside of Ute Tribal land. Regulatory
authority within the State of Utah and outside of Ute Tribal land falls under the purview
of local, state, and, in some instances, federal regulatory bodies.
The trial court's holding is catastrophic to the interests of Plaintiffs and other
business concerns providing products or services in the Uintah Basin. It shrouds tribal
officials, acting ultra vires, and their co-conspirators with sovereign immunity, and
allows them to continue to extort, threaten, harass, and damage, with impunity, every
business which will not capitulate to their edicts, even though the businesses operate
solely outside of Ute Tribal land. Further, if the Tribe were a necessary party for every
action commenced against a tribal official, no action against a tribal official would be
viable. This is contrary to well established precedent.
The UTERO officials are not entitled to immunity for actions undertaken that are
beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribe. For purposes of the motions before the trial court,
the facts that the officials acted outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the Ute Tribe must
be assumed true. R. 562.
In Puyallup Tribe v. Dep 't of Game of the State of Washington, 433 U.S. 165, 168171, 97 S. Ct. 2616, 2619-2620 (1977), the Court held that a suit to enjoin violations of
state law by individual tribal members is permissible and does not implicate sovereign
immunity. The Court further suggested that this includes suits against tribal officials
brought in state court. Id. at 171-173. Even though the defendants in Puyallup Tribe,

supra, were not tribal officials, the Court cited it in finding a tribal governor not immune
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from a suit seeking relief against enforcement of a tribal ordinance. See Santa Clara

Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 1677 (1978).
Consistently, in Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian

Nation, 498 U.S. 505, 514, 111 S. Ct. 905,912 (1991), the Court stated, "In view of our
conclusion with respect to sovereign immunity of the Tribe from suit by the State,
Oklahoma complains that, in effect, decisions such as Moe and Colville give them a right
without any remedy. There is no doubt that sovereign immunity bars the State from
pursuing the most efficient remedy, but we are not persuaded that it lacks any adequate
alternatives. We have never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe are not liable
for damages in actions brought by the State."
An analysis on point is set forth in Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075
(9th Cir. 2013). In Maxwell, the court reasoned that tribal sovereign immunity derives
from the same common law principles that shape state and federal sovereign immunity.

Id. at 1087-88. A suit brought against individual officers in their individual capacities, as
in the instant case, does not implicate sovereign immunity. Id.
More examples include holdings that sovereign immunity does not extend to tribal
officials when acting outside their authority in violation of state law. See 1J1m1p Hotels

& Casino Resorts Dev. Co., LLC v. Rocow, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1215 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 2, 2005). In N. States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux
Indian Cmty., 991 F.2d 458,462, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 7698, ,I,I 11-14 (8th Cir. 1993),
the court held that sovereign immunity does not protect tribal officers acting beyond the
scope of the authority the tribe was capable of bestowing on them. In the instant case,
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Plaintiffs have alleged that the tribal officials are acting beyond the scope of the authority
the Tribe is capable of bestowing, and in violation of state law. R. 562.
The trial court reasoned a" ... determination by the Court that the UTERO
officials' act of sending the directive to Newfield was wrongful is potentially prejudicial
to the Tribe." R. 1768-1769. The trial court continued that this could be prejudicial to the
Tribe's ability to regulate its affairs, the Tribe could ban any person or company from
doing business on Tribal ground for any reason, and the directives at issue could create a
significant prejudice against a key interest in tribal self-governance. R. 1769. It is
expressly clear from the allegations in the Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs do not do
business on tribal ground and the directives at issue were not limited to a prohibition of
utilizing the Plaintiffs' Products on tribal ground but were a blanket
blacklisting/boycotting of Plaintiffs. Generally, 548-579.
Further, the trial court could not conceive of any relief that would not prejudice
the Tribe. R. 1769. Clearly, limiting relief to restraining conduct that is ultra vires, occurs
outside of Ute Tribal land, and in violation of state law as set forth in the Amended
Complaint would prejudice no legitimate interest of the Tribe.
In summary, the Tribe is not a necessary party as to lawsuits brought to enjoin

ultra vires acts of tribal officials that violate state law and occur on state land outside of
Ute Tribal land. Therefore, the Tribe is not a necessary party pursuant to Utah R. of Civ.

P. l 9(a).
If a party is not a necessary party, the inquiry stops and Utah R. of Civ. P. 19(6)
need not be analyzed. However, the trial court also erroneously found that the Tribe is
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an indispensable party under Utah R. of Civ. P. l 9(b ). "If the court finds that the party is
necessary according to these criteria, rule 19 provides that the party shall be joined.
Thus, under the language of the rule, if the party is necessary and joinder is feasible, then
joinder is mandatory. Nevertheless, failure to join generally is not considered to be a
jurisdictional defect." Landes, 795 P .2d at 1131.
The indispensability of a party is determined by examining, "(l) to what extent a
judgment rendered in the [party's] absence will prejudice [the party] or those already
parties; (2) the likelihood of reducing or avoiding prejudice by protective measures or
provisions in the judgment; (3) the adequacy of the judgment which might be entered in
the [party's] absence; and (4) the adequacy of the plaintiffs remedy if the action is
dismissed for nonjoinder." Mower v. Simpson, 2012 UT App 149,128,278 P.3d 1076.
The reasons the Tribe would not suffer prejudice should a judgment be rendered
have been addressed, supra, and will not be reiterated here. However, the trial court also
reasoned that Newfield may be subject to, "inconsistent obligations" in State Court and
before the Tribe. R. 1771. The trial court reasoned, "Because of the potential for
inconsistent judgments between the state courts and the UTERO commission, Newfield is
placed in the untenable position of operating in potential violation of inconsistent
directives from courts of two jurisdictions." R. 1772. Newfield may have to choose
between complying with and aiding tribal officials in unlawful and ultra vires directives
that violate state law causing damages to state residents, or comply with state law and
risk sanctions before the Tribe. However, as set forth in the Amended Complaint, the
business activities at issue occur outside of Ute Tribal land and within the State of Utah.
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Further, the directives at issue resulted in an unlawful boycott of Plaintiffs' Products
outside of Ute Tribal land and within the State of Utah.
Even though the situs of the acts and occurrences is outside of Ute Tribal land, the
effect of the trial court's reasoning is that Newfield is absolutely immune from state law
violations that occur within the state so long as Newfield is complying with a directive
from a tribal official, even an unlawful and ultra vires directive. The state courts have a
duty and obligation to protect state citizenry from violations of state law that occur within
the state. The small business interests of state citizens whose business activities are
outside of Ute Tribal land should not be subjugated

foreign powers simply because the

foreign power may penalize a party for not following an ultra vires directive that
damages a state resident on land located within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land.
There is no justifiable reason that a state court should defer to the Tribe as it relates
business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land.
As it relates to the adequacy of the judgment the trial court reasoned that," ...
without injunctions against the Tribe and its UTERO officials ... " Plaintiffs would have
an inadequate remedy. R. 1769. The injunctions that Plaintiffs requested include that the
tribal officials be restrained from interfering with or attempting to regulate Plaintiffs'
business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 577. The
tribal officials are subject to such injunctive relief. It is true that restraining the tribal
officials also restrains the Tribe. However, when the injunction is limited to stopping
state law violations that occur outside of Ute Tribal land, the Tribe has no legitimate
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interest or complaint. Likewise, a monetary damage award entered against Newfield for
state law violations is an adequate remedy for Plaintiffs.
As it relates to the adequacy of Plaintiffs' remedy if the action is dismissed for
non-joinder, the trial court opined that Plaintiffs could have sought relief through Tribal
Court or tribal administrative procedures. R. 1769-1770. The argument that
administrative remedies must be exhausted is fundamentally flawed and the trial court
fails to explain why Plaintiffs should subject themselves to a tribal forum when the
business activities, acts, and occurrences complained of occurred exclusively within the
state and outside of Ute Tribal land. In essence, the trial court determined it was
appropriate that Plaintiffs subject themselves to tribal regulatory control to address
business activities the situs of which is exclusively intrastate.
In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493,
1981 U.S. LEXIS 9, 49 U.S.L.W. 4296 (1981), a decision authored by Justice Potter
Stewart, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the treaties between the United States and the
Crow Tribe establishing the Tribe's Montana reservation did not give the Crow Tribe
authority to regulate non-Indian fishing on the Big Horn River, which flows through the
heart of the Crow Tribe's reservation. The Court conceded the retention of certain
inherent tribal powers, but denied that these went beyond "what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations." Id. at 564-65.
In Brenda le v. Confederated Tribes & Bandr, of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408,425, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 3005, 106 L. Ed. 2d 343, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3288, 57
U.S.L.W. 4999 (1989), the Court, applying Montana, held that, except for isolated "landPage 26 of 54
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locked" tracts surrounded by tribal lands, tribes could not zone reservation fee land
owned by nonmembers. A tribe's general interest in regulating reservation land use could
not, according to the Court, support its jurisdiction under the second Montana exception.

Id. at 428. In the instant case, tribal officials are attempting to regulate business activity
occurring on fee land located outside of Ute Tribal land. This is well beyond a Montana
exception.
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997), the Montana
rule assumed its modern form. The issue in Strate was tribal court jurisdiction over
claims brought by tribal members against a nonmember arising from a motor vehicle
accident on the Fort Berthold reservation. Id. at 442. First, the Court extended the

Montana rule previously applied to tribal regulatory authority to a tribe's adjudicatory
authority, holding that the scope of a tribe's adjudicatory authority could not exceed the
scope of its regulatory authority. Id. at 453. Second, the Court effectively held that the
exceptions to the general Montana rule really were not exceptions at all. Id. at 459.
Conceding that "[ r]ead in isolation, the Montana rule's second exception can be
misperceived," the Court declared as the "key" to its proper application is the underlying
principle that a tribe's authority does not extend beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations. Id.
Attempting to regulate business activity that occurs outside of Ute Tribal land has
nothing to do with protecting tribal self-government or the ability to control internal
relations. U.S. Supreme Court decisions make clear there is a presumption against tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers and, in the absence of congressional delegation, the burden
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is on the Tri be to show that one of the Jvfontana exceptions applies. The business
activities at issue take place outside of Ute Tribal land. There is no Montana exception
that would subject Plaintiffs to the Tribe's jurisdiction and any administrative remedies
under tribal law. Plaintiffs should not have to subject themselves to a foreign jurisdiction
to protect business operations that are exclusively intrastate, outside of Ute Tribal land,
and well beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribe.
B.

The trial court erred in not concluding that the state's interests in promoting

fair and competitive business activity free from unlawful interference from foreign
powers by protecting non-Indian state residents, who compose roughly 95% of the
area population, state small businesses, and the oil and gas industry, which is the
lifeblood of the local economy, outweigh the interests of the Tribe in regulating nonIndian business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land.

The recent trend of decisions from the Supreme Court requires that suits involving
a non-Indian on privately owned land must be brought in state court. See generally Robert
D. Probasco, Indian Tribe, Civil Rights, and Federal Courts, 7 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev.
119 (2001) (explaining the jurisdictional rules applicable to Indians and non-Indians that

depend upon land ownership).
In Montana, supra, the Supreme Court held that tribes lack regulatory jurisdiction
except where, "necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations". 450 U.S. at 561. The narrow exceptions, inapplicable to the case at bar, are as
to those entering consensual relationships with the tribe or if the conduct threatens or has
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some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe. In the instant case the Tribe lacks jurisdiction. The parties include
Indians and non-Indians, the conduct occurred outside of Ute Tribal land, and no
exception is applicable that would provide the Tribe with jurisdiction.
However, a state may regulate activities on Indian reservations when it has a
sufficient interest. For example, states have jurisdiction to tax the output of mines and oil
wells of any lessee of Indian lands. See 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1927). In Hagen, supra, the
Supreme Court found the reservation was diminished and considered the following
factors: (1) The area is predominately populated by non-Indians; (2) A finding that the
land remains Indian Country seriously burdens the administration of state and local
governments; (3) The State of Utah has exercised jurisdiction over the lands open to nonIndian settlement from the time the reservation was opened; and (4) That a contrary
conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the
area. 510 U.S. at 420-21.
Assuming for argument purposes this were a case of concurrent jurisdiction, the
Court would balance the interests of protecting the vast majority of the area's population
and the lifeblood of the local economy from the conduct set forth in the Alleged
Complaint. Not only does the Tribe lack jurisdiction based upon the situs of the conduct
in question, balancing the interests involved strongly favors state jurisdiction. Uintah
Basin residents who have spent a lifetime, and in some cases generations, developing
small business interests should not be under the constant threat of having business
operations shut down overnight because they refuse to be extorted by a tribal official
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acting ultra vi res and in violation of state law. Especially, where the situs is outside of
Ute Tribal land.
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
1.

Overview and Legal Standard

The alternative bases for the trial court's dismissal will be addressed in this
section. There is considerable overlap between Defendants' respective motions and
common legal standards of review. The general standard of review applicable is set forth
below. Any issue with a different standard will be expressly addressed in the subsection
as applicable.
Fed. R. of Civ. P. 8(a)2 (2010) requires a pleading to contain a "short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoted authority and citations omitted),
the Court instructed that Rule 8 does not require "detailed factual allegations," and then
stated:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiffpleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ''probability requirement" but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
The Court then pointed out that "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations,
a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether those facts plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679.
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A Utah R. of Civ. P. 12(6)(6) defense is a challenge to Plaintiffs' right to relief
based on facts Plaintiffs have alleged. See Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264,
1995 Utah LEXIS 43, 2 (Utah 1995). A court reviews a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
determine whether Plaintiffs would be entitled to relief under any state of facts which
could be proved in support of its claims. See Heiner v. SJ. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d
107, 109, 1990 Utah App. LEXIS 66, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The court must accept the
factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Alvarez

v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987,989, 1997 Utah LEXIS 22, 5 (Utah 1997).
2.

Tortious Interference with Economic Relations

The elements of a claim for tortious interference with economic relations include,

"(l) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential or
existing economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3)
causing injury to plaintiff." Leigh Furniture & Ca,pet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304
1982 Utah LEXIS 1130, 30 (Utah 1982).
The trial comt found that the factual allegations against Newfield failed to provide
Newfield" ... fair notice of the actions complained of." R. 1779. In addition to the
Amended Complaint, the trial court also considered a March 20, 2013 letter from tribal
officials. R. 1778. The relevant portions of the March 20, 2013, letter considered by the
trial court include, "Any use of these businesses and individuals [Plaintiffs] by an
employer doing work on the Reservation after receipt of this Notice may result in the
assessment of penalties and/or sanctions against such employer to the fullest extent of the
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law." R. 000053. Notably, this directive is not limited to use of the Plaintiffs on Ute
Tribal land but is rather a blanket boycott/blacklist of Plaintiffs regardless of the situs of
the business activity.
As it relates to fair notice of the actions complained of the allegations of the
Amended Complaint are that: (1) Newfield agreed to cooperate with the tribal officials

ultra vires directive and boycott Plaintiffs; (2) Newfield refused to work with any third
party that does business with Plaintiffs; (3) Newfield intentionally interfered with
Plaintiffs existing and potential relations; (4) Newfield acted with an improper purpose
and/or through improper means in aid of the tribal officials; (5) Newfield did so to
promote its own business interests; and (6) these actions are the direct and proximate
cause of injury to Plaintiffs. R 558-559, 567-568. Contrary to the trial court's finding, the
facts set forth in the Amended Complaint allege that Newfield not only agreed to join in
the boycott and blacklisting of Plaintiffs, but that Newfield threatened to boycott any
third party who conducted business with Plaintiffs. Id.
Moreover, Utah courts have ruled that in commercial settings a court should look
to improper means and have said that "improper means is shown when the plaintiff
proves that the defendant's means of interference were contrary to statutory, regulatory,
or common law .... " U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App. 303, ,J49, 990
P.2d 945 (quoted authority omitted). Improper means can include violence, threats and
violating established standards of the trade or profession. St. Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St.

Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,201, 1991 Utah LEXIS 36, 22 (Utah 1991) ((quoting Top
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Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201, 210 n.11, 582 P.2d 1365, 1371
n.11 (1978)).
The Amended Complaint sets forth substantial and detailed facts concerning
improper means in relationship to Newfield. The UTERO officials desired to regulate
businesses outside of Ute Tribal land, and the UTERO Commissioners sought payment of
bribes and to extort area small businesses. Generally, 548-579. The UTERO
Commissioners, in an attempt to force Plaintiffs to pay them bribes and to comply with
the UTERO ordinance outside of Ute Tribal land, threatened Plaintiffs that they would
put them out of business. Id. To accomplish that illegal activity, the UTERO
Commissioners blacklisted and boycotted Plaintiffs. Id. Newfield assisted the UTERO
Commissioners in that illegal activity, participating in the boycott, and refusing to use
Plaintiffs' Products and also refusing to use the services of anyone who did business with
Plaintiffs, as requested by the UTERO Commissioners. Id. The boycott and blacklisting,
as well as the extortionist demands, are unlawful. Id. But for Newfield's cooperation
and aid the unlawful threats of tribal officials would be empty. Id. These activities
constitute improper means on the part of Newfield. The elements of the tort of unlawful
interference with prospective economic advantage have been properly pled.

3.

Extortion

Newfield argued and the trial court agreed that Utah does not recognize a cause of
action for extortion. R. 1779-1780. This is an issue of first impression and the trial court
failed to support its position with any meaningful analysis. The cases cited by Newfield
in support of its position before the trial court, however, are not dis positive on that
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assertion. Jensen v. America's Wholesale Lender, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67777, 2010
WL 2720745 (D. Utah 2010), involved prose litigants, and the court's holding consists
of a conclusory ruling, devoid of any legal analysis. The report and recommendation in

Whipple v. Utah, No. 2: I O-cv-81 1 DAK, 201 1 WL 4368568 (D. Utah Aug. 25, 2011)
(unreported) does not analyze the issue, but simply asserts that there is no civil cause of
action in Utah for theft.

.,.
t:./,

Utah has, however, allowed for civil relief in such circumstances. See e.g. Hill v.

Estate of Allred, 2009 UT 28,216 P.3d 929; Alta Indus. LTD v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282,
1290 (Utah 1993); Bonnie & Hyde Inc. v. Lynch, 2013 UT App. 153,305 P.3d 196.
Extortion is a theft crime in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-406 (1973). In Utah,
individuals have a right to seek recovery when they have been subjected to a theft in its
many varieties. See e.g. Hill, 2009 UT 28; Alta Indus., 846 P.2d at 1290.
Extortion has also been recognized as a tort cause of action in some states. In
California, it is sometimes referred to as duress or economic duress. See Crosstalk

Productions Inc. v. Jacobsen, 65 Cal. App. 4th 631, 645 (1998) (quoted authority
omitted), stating that the elements are threats to business or property "sufficiently
coercive to cause a reasonably prudent person to be faced with no reasonable alternative
but to 'succumb'" to the threat. Utah has adopted a cause of action in contract law that
allows the voiding of a contract for economic duress. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc v. Johnson,
596 P.2d 658, 660 (Utah 1979). Counsel was unable to locate any decision directly
addressing whether Utah recognizes extortion or duress as a tort. However, Utah has
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recognized an individual's right to sue personally for losses caused by theft and there is
no reason that right should not include extortion.
In the instant case the demands for extortion and threats put Plaintiffs under
extreme duress. These threats were particularly alarming to Plaintiffs who were aware of
similarly situated businesses that were shut down by tribal officials if the businesses
refused to be extorted. These threats cut directly to the viability of area businesses and the
ability of area residents to earn a livelihood.
4.

Utah Antitrust Act

The trial court found that "[t]he Plaintiffs offer no facts alleging that Newfield and
the other Defendants had a meeting of the minds to boycott Plaintiffs' business. All that
is alleged is UTERO informed Newfield that the Rocks Off was no longer allowed to
conduct business on tribal land, and Newfield relayed the message to the Plaintiffs
explaining that Newfield was not going to do business with Plaintiffs due to the UTERO
notice. The Plaintiffs' claim merely recites the elements of an antitrust claim." R. 1780.
The facts in the Amended Complaint directly conflict with the trial court's finding.
The Amended Complaint is expressly clear that Plaintiffs do not conduct business on
tribal land and Plaintiffs do not even have to pass through tribal land in conducting
Plaintiffs' business activities. R. 554-555. The tribal officials demand was not limited to
Ute Tribal land but a general boycott of Plaintiffs' businesses. Further, Newfield
facilitated the boycott by demanding all third parties it does business with to boycott
Plaintiffs in furtherance of the" ... unlawful UTERO blacklist and boycott of Plaintiffs."
R. 559.
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Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-3101 (2013) provides that "[t]he purpose of [the Utah
Antitrust Act] is ... to encourage free and open competition ... by prohibiting ... unfair
trade practices, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade .... " The statute is to
be interpreted in light of the strong public policy disfavoring anti-competitive practices."

Summit Water Distrib. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, ~29, 123 P.2d 437 (citing City of
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,398 (1978)), and the provisions of the
statute are to be broadly construed. Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 185, 1998 Utah LEXIS
37, 25-26 (Utah 1998).
Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action alleges that Defendants, including Newfield,
entered into contracts, agreements or conspiracies to place unlawful restraints on trade or
commerce, and that they were involved in an unlawful boycott of Plaintiffs. R. 569-572.
Newfield argued before the trial court that there is no contract, combination or
conspiracy. "' [N]o formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy,'
and ... 'business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact
finder may infer agreement."' Brixen & Christopher Architects v. State, 2001 UT App
210, 135, 29 P.3d 650 (quoted authority omitted). The conspiracy may be vertical or
horizontal. Id. at ~1 36-39.
The factual allegations are that the UTERO Commissioners sent a letter to
Newfield asking it to boycott Plaintiffs and not purchase Products from Plaintiffs or from
anyone who obtained Products from Plaintiffs. R. 558-559. The UTERO Commissioners
further asked Newfield to purchase those Products from entities in which the UTERO
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Commissioners owned an interest, such as Larose Construction, or from whom they were
receiving bribes or kickbacks, such as Huffman. R. 569-572.
The UTERO Commissioners intended to put Plaintiffs out of business through the
unlawful boycott. R. 571. Newfield expressly agreed to that request in written
communications sent to Plaintiffs and ceased purchasing Products from Plaintiffs. R.
558-559. In addition, Newfield demanded that third party businesses participate on the
boycott. R. 558-559. Such action manifests an agreement, contract, combination or
conspiracy.
Newfield's argument before the trial court, and the trial court's finding that the
Amended Complaint does not allege any facts of the agreement, ignores the factual
allegations in paragraphs 18 thru 96 of the Amended Complaint, including allegations
that the UTERO Commissioners intended to shut down Plaintiffs' business, that, on
March 20, 2013, Newfield was told not to utilize Plaintiffs' Products, that, on March 22,
2013, Newfield agreed with that unlawful boycott request and informed Plaintiffs it
would no longer utilize Plaintiffs' Products and that it would also not use any business
that utilized Plaintiffs' Products. R. 552-562. Newfield agreed to and did cooperate with
the tribal officials in this boycott to put Plaintiffs out of business and to enhance the
businesses in which the tribal officials had an interest or from whom they were receiving
bribes. R. 552-562, 568-571. Plaintiffs also alleged bid rigging. Specifically, " ... that
UTERO officials dictate to oil and gas companies which contractors will be awarded bids
and which contractors are not to be used." R. 561. This bid rigging is not limited to Ute
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Tribal land and as set forth in the amended complaint the conduct complained of occurs
outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 562.
The present case is not unlike State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805 (Ut. Ct. App.
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), where a security officer
accepted monies to exclude other security guard service providers from successfully
bidding on the Utah Power and Light contract. Here Newfield, while not taking a bribe,
but wanting to ensure work from the Tribe, agreed to prevent Plaintiffs and others from
receiving orders from Newfield for Products, so that those orders went to entities in
which the UTERO Commissioners had an interest or which were bribing the UTERO
Commissioners.
Plaintiffs must also show that the "alleged concerted action imposes an
unreasonable restraint on trade." The Fifth Cause of Action is based on the Utah Antitrust
Act. Under Utah law, "[s]ome activities in restraint of trade 'have such a predictable and
pernicious anti-competitive effect, and such limited potential for pro-competitive benefit,
that they are deemed unlawful per se."' Brixen, 2001 UT App 210 if41, (quoted authority
omitted); See also Utah Code Ann. §76-10-3112 (2013) (identifying "price fixing, bid

rigging, agreeing among competitors to divide customers or territories, or ... engaging
in a group boycott with specific intent of eliminating competition" as per se violations).
Notably, in Thompson, supra, the court observed that per se violations of a group
boycott under Utah statute could be interpreted more broadly than under federal law, 751
P.2d at 813, stating that "[a]lthough the coercive pressure was applied vertically, the
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stifling of competition was horizontal. A conspiracy to form a group boycott was
therefore established." Id. at 814 (cited authority omitted).
The actions of Newfield and the UTERO Commissioners amount to an illegal
boycott, bid rigging and/or restraint of trade, clearly harming the local oil and gas
industry by increasing production costs (valid market) in the Uintah Basin and the public
that pays for that activity as it damages the local economic activity by hurting all
businesses operating in the local oil and gas industry, which is the lifeblood of the local
economy. The Amended Complaint alleges that Newfield and the UTERO officials
conspired to eliminate Plaintiffs as competitors, diverted work from Plaintiffs in
exchange for bribes from Plaintiffs' competitors, diverted work to competitors in which
tribal officials had an interest and illegally boycotted Plaintiffs. R. 568-571. These
allegations not only plead sufficient circumstances under the rule of reason analysis, but
Plaintiffs have pled per se violations of state law including unlawful boycotting and bid
rigging. R. 552-562, 568-571.
5.

Blacklisting

In an analysis consisting of a single paragraph, the trial court found that, "The
facts allege that Newfield followed the direction of UTERO by not using Plaintiff for
work completed on tribal land because the Plaintiff was no longer licensed to do work on
tribal land." R. 1781. This finding directly conflicts with the facts set forth in the
Amended Complaint. R. 548-579. This demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of
the trial court in that work done on tribal land and Plaintiffs working on tribal land was
never alleged in the Amended Complaint and is not at issue. See R. 562. Plaintiffs'
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Amended Complaint alleges the contrary. R. 562. Specifically, that Plaintiffs' business
operations are conducted outside of tribal land and Plaintiffs do not work on tribal land.
R. 553-555.
Before the trial court, Newfield asserted that Utah does not recognize a cause of
action for blacklisting, relying on Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the version of Section 19, Article
XII, of the Utah Constitution, in effect at that time, did not create a private cause of
action, because Section 19 instructed that the legislature would provide for enforcement
and that the legislature had provided criminal sanctions in Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-24-1
and 34-24-2. However, the court, in rendering its decision, noted that its decision was
premised upon the constitutional provision "in force at the time," and that "the last
sentence [of Section 19) was stricken by constitutional amendment effective on January
1, 1993 ." Id. at 10, n.2. Indeed, the amendment removed the language that the
legislature would provide a remedy for a constitutional violation. Moreover, in 2013,
Utah Code Ann.§§ 34-24-1 and 34-24-2, were themselves repealed.
The floor debate on the issue of the repeal of§§ 34-24-1 and 34-24-1 is
elucidating on the issue of a civil cause of action for blacklisting. Senator Daniel
Thatcher, the bill's sponsor, contended there was no need for the criminal statute as he
could not find a case of its being prosecuted, and that blacklisting was already covered by
civil law, stating, among other things, that "where causing financial harm to another
person is covered under civil law which really is a more appropriate place for this to be
handled" and "the current practice is to handle all of this under civil law." Recording of
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Utah Senate Floor Debates, S.B. 142, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 4, 2013). Senator John
Valentine, speaking in favor of the bill, agreed that no criminal repercussions for
blacklisting were needed, averring, "I have seen lots of cases brought in the civil [court] .
. ., where this cause of action is widely recognized, [and] is widely proceeded upon by
attorneys," and "there's an adequate remedy in ... civil matters to sue for damages and
for injunctive relief.'' Id. Senator Thatcher then, in summation, emphasized, "The act of
stopping someone who has done no wrong from getting another job is a deplorable act, it
is a shameful act, and it is an act where the person wronged should have the opportunity
to sue for redress of grief, which is the current practice. I am not proposing that
blacklisting ... is appropriate." Id. In short, both senators strenuously argued the criminal
provisions of the repealed sections were unnecessary as the baneful act of blacklisting
could be addressed in civil court, as Plaintiffs seek to do in this matter.
Of note, in 2012, many years after the decision cited by Newfield and even before
the repeal of the aforesaid statutory provisions, in Brock v. Herbert, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42041, il 7, 2012 WL 1029355 (D. Utah 2012), the court recognized the
possibility of blacklisting claims, stating "Utah courts have given little guidance on the
scope and applicability of these provisions, referring to Utah Const. Art. XII § 19 and
XVI §4, in cases like the one currently before the court. Novel questions of state law
should be decided by state courts."
Newfield also argued before the trial court that there was no allegation of an
exchange of blacklists, but this ignores the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint. The
UTERO Commissioners blacklisted Plaintiffs and told Newfield not to use them or their
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services or the services of those utilizing Plaintiffs' services, even though Plaintiffs'
operate outside of Ute Tribal land. Newfield agreed to cooperate with the UTERO
officials, and, in fact, did take that illegal action. Newfield also refused to do business
with parties who were doing business with Plaintiffs. This clearly interfered with
Plaintiffs' employment, ability to earn a livelihood, and such is a violation of Articles
Utah Const. Art. XII § 19 and XVI §4
6.

Civil Conspiracy

The trial com1, in an analysis consisting of a brief paragraph, found as relevant to
this appeal, "The Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint does not allege any facts
concerning an underlying tort. Nor have the Plaintiffs alleged any facts showing
Newfield and the other Defendants came to a meeting of the minds to commit an
unlawful act against Plaintiffs." R. 1782. For the reasons set forth supra, the trial court's
finding directly conflicts with or ignores the allegations set forth in the Amended
Complaint.
The trial court's finding ignores the provisions of the Amended Complaint that
contain the allegations with respect to the torts of interference with prospective economic
advantage, extortion, blacklisting and antitrust. These allegations, as stated in the
Amended Complaint, are incorporated into each successive claim.
The Amended Complaint alleges that the UTERO Commissioners communicated
with Newfield and asked for its support in the commission of these torts by refusing to
continue to use Plaintiffs' Products. Newfield agreed with the UTERO Commissioners
(meeting of the minds) to assist the UT.ERO Commission in committing these torts and
Page 42 of 54
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

illegal activity. Newfield then complied with the request and stopped using Plaintiffs'
Products, and Newfield also refused to use third-party service providers that utilized
Plaintiffs' Products.
Civil conspiracy requires (1) combination of two or more persons (in this case
Newfield and the UTERO Commissioners), (2) object to be accomplished (put Plaintiffs
out of business and enhance selected competitors), (3) a meeting of the minds on the
course of action (UTERO Commissioners asked Newfield to participate in the illegal
boycott and not buy services and products from Plaintiffs or those purchasing Products
from Plaintiffs and Newfield agreed), (4) one or more unlawful acts (illegal boycott and
restraint of trade, extortion, blacklisting) and (5) damages. See Alta Industries LTD v.

Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, n. 17, 1993 Utah LEXIS 37,205 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 1993)
(listing the elements of civil conspiracy).
7.

Claims against D.Ray Enterprises and LaRose Construction

The trial court's factual analysis of the 12(b)(6) motion made by D.Ray
Enterprises and Larose Construction consists of two sentences. These two sentences
read, "The Amended Verified Complaint only alleges facts regarding the individual
Defendants' actions as individuals and as government officials of the Tribe.
Consequently, the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
against these two corporate Defendants." R. 1785.
The allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint relevant to these corporate
defendants are as follows. That LaRose, as on owner of Larose Construction, receives
bribes and work from Huffman, a competitor of Plaintiffs, in exchange for LaRose
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abusing his position as a tribal officer and wrongfully diverting business from Plaintiffs
to Huffman. R. 561. Further, that LaRose, L.C. Welding, and Scamp conspired to receive
an economic interest in a competing gravel pit located on " ... private fee land which
commenced operations immediately after Plaintiffs operations were shut down by
Director Wopsock." R. 571. Cesspooch owns an interest in an oil & gas service company
D.Ray Enterprises. R. 562. Cesspooch, LaRose, and Director Wopsock conspired to
abuse their UTERO positions to eliminate Plaintiffs as a competitor. R. 571. In addition,
these tribal officials conspired to abuse their positions to destroy Plaintiffs' businesses for
refusing to be extorted by Cesspooch. R. 571. That LaRose Construction and D.Ray
Enterprises " ... participate in the conspiracy and derived a substantial economic benefit
from the Conspiring Defendants' unlawful restraint of trade and commerce." R. 571.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the trial court," ... has jurisdiction over the tribal
officials based on the tribal officials' violation of state law, the acts complained of by the
tribal officials are ultra vires, and the unlawful and unauthorized conduct has caused and
continues to cause substantial and irreparable harm to non-Indian Plaintiffs business
activities on private fee land that is not Indian Country or reservation ... " R. 562.

It is difficult to understand why the trial court failed to consider these factual
allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint in dismissing the action as it relates to
LaRose Construction and D.Ray Enterprises. Plaintiffs expressly and clearly alleged that
these companies engaged in the conspiracy for the express purpose of eliminating
Plaintiffs as a competitor and because Plaintiffs refused to be extorted. Further, the
location of this wrongful conduct was outside of Ute Tribal land.
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D.

The trial court erred in concluding that the tribal officials are immune from

suit when the conduct complained of violates state law, occurred outside of Ute
Tribal land, within the State of Utah and outside the jurisdiction of the Tribe.

In dismissing the action against the tribal officials the trial court found that, "The
Plaintiffs allege that the UTERO officials acted beyond the scope of the authority given
them to regulate business on tribal land." R. 1787. Plaintiffs alleged nothing of the sort in
the Amended Complaint. In fact, Plaintiffs allege exactly the opposite.
What Plaintiffs allege in the Amended Complaint is that, "This Court has
jurisdiction over the tribal officials based on the tribal officials violations of state law, the
acts complained of by the tribal officials are ultra vires, and the unlawful and
unauthorized conduct has caused and continues to cause substantial and irreparable harm
to non-Indian Plaintiffs' business activities on private fee land that is not Indian Country
or reservation as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114
S. Ct. 958 (1994)." R. 562. This allegation and theme is repeated throughout the
Amended Complaint. Generally, 548-579. Therefore, the trial court's statements that the
situs of the acts at issue is Ute Tribal land directly diverges from the facts alleged
throughout the Amended Complaint. Id. Further, the tribal officials are sued in their
individual as well as their official capacities. Accordingly, the trial court's analysis
misses the mark.
The trial court found that the Tribe was the "real party in interest" in dismissing
this action as to the tribal officials. R. 1787. However, precedent makes clear that tribal
officers are liable for damages for ultra vires acts. In Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n, 498 U.S.
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at 514, the Court stated, "we have never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe
are not liable for damage in actions brought by the State." This statement was made even
though the Court recognized that there was" ... no doubt that sovereign immunity ... "
barred the" ... most efficient remedy .... " which would have been a suit against the
tribe. Id.
As explained by the D.C. Circuit, "There may be, of course, suits for specific
relief against officers of the sovereign which are not suits against the sovereign ....
[W]here the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations
are considered individual and not sovereign actions ... " Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d
741, 750, 383 U.S. App. D.C. 14, 23, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16561 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Co,p., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949)).

As alleged in the instant case, the actions of the tribal officials are not only beyond the
scope of the OTERO ordinance but also beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribe
itself which infringes upon the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. R. 562.
The Ninth Circuit has held that tribal officials enjoy immunity only to the extent
of the tribe's valid authority. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of
Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 924 F.2d 899,902 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S.

1212 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Big Horn County Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Adams,
219 F .3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000). In the instant case Tribe officials are engaged in wrongful
conduct outside of Ute Tribal land that damages non-Indian state residents and small
businesses. This is beyond the Tribe's jurisdiction and "valid authority" making
Burlington on point. The holding that tribal officials lack immunity for conduct beyond
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the jurisdiction of the tribe has been followed by many circuits. See Baker Electric Co-

op, Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1471-72 (8th Cir. l 994t see also Wisconsin v. Baker,
698 F.2d 1323, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); see also

Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16, 30 (1st Cir. 2006 (en bane,
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1053 (2006).
In all of these cases, it could be argued that the tribe is the real party in interest.
However, when the allegation is that tribal officials have acted beyond the scope of the
authority the tribe is capable of bestowing, such as in the instant case, there is no
immunity for the tribal officials. The trial court's dismissal on the grounds that the Tribe
is the real party in interest runs afoul of well-reasoned precedent of the circuit courts.
E.

The Tribe Waived Sovereign Immunity

On August 2, 2013, the parties submitted briefing to the trial court on the issue of
whether the Tribe made a general appearance in this action. A determination of that issue
was not made by the trial court at the time of the January 29, 2016 hearing on the
motions to dismiss at issue in the instant appeal. On January 29, 2016, Plaintiffs provided
the Court and opposing counsel with cases holding that sovereign immunity is waived if
an Indian Tribe makes a general appearance in a state court action. This issue is an issue
of first impression and a question of law.
In Friends of East Willits Valley v. Cnty ofMendocino, 101 Cal. App. 4th 191,
197, 202, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 4509, 2002 Cal. Daily Op.
Service 7488, 2002 Daily Journal DAR 9380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2002), the court
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cited with approval a prior unpublished opinion that concluded that because an Indian
Tribe made a general appearance in a state court action it waived its sovereign immunity.
In United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1015, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 17888
(9th Cir. 1981 ), the court held that a tribe, by intervening in a lawsuit, assumed the risk
that its position would not be accepted and thereby waived sovereign immunity in the
proceeding. The court reasoned, "Here, the Tribe intervened to establish and protect its
treaty fishing rights; a basic assumption of that action was that there would be fish to
protect. Had the original decree found the species to be in jeopardy, and enjoined all
parties from future fishing in order to conserve the species, the Yakimas could not have
then claimed immunity from such an action. Otherwise, tribal immunity might be
transformed into a rule that tribes may never lose a lawsuit." Id. at 1014.
A California trial court cited the above decisions when it found that a Tribe
waived sovereign immunity when it appeared before the court and sought affirmative
relief. See Nushake, Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, CGC-05-441299.
The general principle of the cases cited, supra, is that if a tribe seeks affirmative
relief from a state court, or federal court, the tribe has waived sovereign immunity. This
principle is consistent with Barlow v. Cappo, 821 P.2d 465,467 (Utah App. 1991),
holding that when a defendant seeks affirmative relief from a Court, the defendant has
submitted himself to that court's jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the Tribe has sought affirmative relief from the trial court that
necessarily entails a concession that this Court has jurisdiction over this action. For
example, the Tribe argued before the trial court that not only should the case be dismissed
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because the Tribe has sovereign immunity, but the Court should dismiss the action as to
the remaining defendants because the Tribe is a necessary and indispensable party.
Consequently, the Tribe has gone beyond seeking dismissal based on sovereign immunity
grounds, it has sought affirmative relief on behalf of other defendants, in addition to the
Tribe, and moved for a dismissal of the action as to these defendants as well.
The Tribe has also requested that this Court interpret certain provisions of the
UTERO Ordinance and tribal law in consideration of the issues of waiver of sovereign
immunity and dismissal on the grounds of exhaustion of administrative remedies. To
dismiss on these grounds, the Court must have jurisdiction. By moving to dismiss on
these grounds, the Tribe has waived immunity and conceded jurisdiction by requesting
relief that necessitates that the trial court exercise jurisdiction. The Tribe could have
limited its motion to dismissing the action as to the Tribe on the grounds of sovereign
immunity. However, the Tribe, on multiple occasions, has sought affirmative relief from
the state court on grounds that concede jurisdiction. Plaintiffs seek leave to submit
briefing on this issue.

F.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement
Utah R. of Civ. P. 15(d) provides:
(d) Supplemental pleadings. -- Upon motion of a party the
court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as
are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting
forth transactions or occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the
original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for
relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the
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adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so
order, specifying the time therefor.
"The corni's standard for exercising discretion on a motion to supplement is the
same as that for disposing of a motion to amend under Rule 15(a)[2]." First Savings

Bank v. U.S. Bancorp, 184 F.R.D. 363,368 (D. Kan. 1998) (quoted authority and
citations omitted). In considering motions to amend pleadings, primary considerations
are whether parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and whether any party
receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.,
786 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoted authority and citations omitted).
Rule lS(d) provides that "[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on
just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction,
occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15( d). A Rule 15(d) motion is "addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, and leave to serve a supplemental pleading 'should be liberally granted unless good
reason exists for denying leave.'" Sw. Nurseries, LLC v. Florists Mut. Ins., Inc., 266 F.
Supp. 2d 1253, 1256 (D. Colo. 2003) (quoting Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 240

F.3d 1268, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001 )). "Refusing leave to amend is generally only justified
upon a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or
dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or
futility of amendment." Frankv. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993).
Despite the passage of time, this case is in its infancy and allowing leave to supplement
will not prejudice any party.
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IX. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reverse the
trial court's decision in its entirety and remand the case back to trial court.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2016.
JOHN D. HANCOCK LAW GROUP, PLLC

Isl John D. Hancock
John D. Hancock, Esq. (#10435)

Attorney for Appellants
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Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party
in the action if ( 1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i} as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the
court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be
made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his
joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person as described in Subdivision
(a)(1 )-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent
person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to
what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already
parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action
is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if
known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision (a}( 1)-(2} hereof who are not joined,
and the reasons why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23.
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.,
IN THE EIGHTH JUDIG)AJ.,.DISTIUCT COUitl'.'
IN A.NDYOR,. I~U{JHE$NE COUNTYi R,OOSEVELTDEI~:ART~1El'Jl.'; STATE OF \JTAH

RULINCfAND. ORDER.

vs;

...

lJt~ Iµd.i~ Tribe;Qf ~e Uintah and Ouray
Reservation, et al.,
)

Case No. 1300000()9

Jtidge SAMUEL:P>CHIAM

Def~r,.dants.
This matt~; is before the Co:utt on the ~fotion to Dis111iss Amended Verified Complaint
filed QY the U1e Indilill Tribe of the Uintah ~d Ouray Reservation e•Tr.ibtf). LC. Welding &
Construction. Jnc.fand Huffman Ertteprises, lim.
{.

The Oefenp.ants are divided; into three groups, each represel'lted by different counsel./fhe
Def'e11dants maki~~ this Motion include the. Tribe of tl:!e Uintah and OtirayRC$erlation ('4Ttibe"),
LG; Welding~ sonsttuction, In~., artd l:IuffmanEnterprises$foc.

~1r. J. Preston:stieff

·represents thesePefendants. the.Defendants D. Ray Cesspoq~h.$heifa WopSQck)~ij:)~1:kje.
.,··

12Rris~. in.tl:1eitiiidividual capacities, and asrepresentativ.es oftheUtelndian Tr1b~!.andl,aR.ose•

Co:nstru9do1'.{ColripM'.Y,
Inc., artdDiRaY C. Ei).!etpl'ises. L.L.C.~ are repr.~sented byMr. Joel T.
: ~-.
.

Zenger. Defenda~is Newfield PM,µ9tiori. CQµ1pa:rty~ NeVtifie14 R-0cky Mt:itita~ns,.mc., J'.,lewfi(}ld
RMJ,/l'.J,C. and Niwne1dDrlHiu$ Services, Inc.,. ar~ repres~med by 'Mr:;. 'C)lµstqph~r:J\Jfog{e .
ThePlaj:rttif}"s ~e-;eptesented l>y ~tµise}, Mr. Jpim Hancock, Mt. CiarkAllted and Mt)Brad
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ADDENDUM PAGE 3

;~:..:

Brotherso11.
The portion of this motion seeking dismissal on the, grouil,ds th.at the Tdbe is an
indispensable partyisjoiried by-all ofth.e defendants,

The Court :heard oral argument orF this ,Motion and on the motions· of· the other

Defendants 01i:Jaii~aty 29, 2016~ Oral argu:1nentwas provided ftoin ,at.I of the.J>a1ties

on Gach of

the Motions. The:issues were taken under advisement. After careful review of' the pleadings, the ·
~gmnents:i and the relevant case law~ the Cou~: is prepared tt:>nile on the iss1Jcs.
n

The Defendants move. the Court to dismiss th~ Plai.11tiff:Sf Verified Co.mplaint. pursu.anttc>
Rule t;2{b)(l) an.i12(b)(7) of the. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, The Defendants argue this

+

..

Court lacks sµbje¢tin.atter jtif.i.sdictiori because the Tribe enjoys· sove1\eigq •imrn unity.
~

,.~

Additionally~ the Defendants argue thatthe Verified Complaint'should b,;.-dismissed as to an

Defendants because·-i~e Tribe i~ a necessary and i:n.di.spensable:party .pursuant-to Rule l9.
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
1~
(

Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue. Ramey Constr. Ca.., Inc~ v. The Apache
Tribe ofthe Me.<;c~lero Reservation; 673 F.2d 315; 3 l8 (10th Cir. 1982). An Indian tribe is·
;

·immune from sui-iimless the tribe has \.vaived its immunity orCQngress authorized-the snit
Kiow(i Tribe of Okldhoma v. 1\lanujacturing· technoiogies-,

Inc,,~-- 52JtJ;S. 751, 754 {198:8). In.

order to wa.ivetd&al sovereign:immuiiity.Co:ngress mustun¢quivofa1Iy·exptessits intent to do
:so, or the tribe mt.i~tdeaily waive immunity. C&L Enterprises., Inc.
·f.

.

.

.. .

.

.··:

y, :Citizen Band Po,tawato,ni

:

l11:dian:Tribeo/O~lal{o11t~1, 532 U.S. 411,418 (2001);.seealso.SantaClai~a:v. Pueblo v.
/.:

Martinez~4$(i 1J.S\ 49) 58 (1978). "A~sent an effective waiver or consent,.itis settled t.llat a state,
''!

~;-:

,_,L_ ... •·: . .

:·

.

..

.

..

.

,

. , .··

. . .·.

. ..

c.ourt may not exercise. jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe;'~ Puyallup Tribe, 1nc; v.
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DepartmentofG:dine ofState ofWash., 433 lJ.S; 165~ 172 (1977).

ThetJte fudian. Ttibe~sLaw and Ord.er Code des¢ribeI$ the extent of.thcTi-il;Je's.s.tJ:Vereign
irru11unity and:the:bircurnstanc<}S in.which the.tribe's sovcreignimmurfrty.tnay be waive~~

Except8$ £1¢qµited by federal law, pflhe Constitution and Bylaws pf the Ut~ In.dian
~ts· specifically wah1ed by a re.soluti.on or ordinance ot the Bush1ess
Committee specifica1lyreferri11g to such, the Ute Indian:Tribe shall ·be imnwn~ from
sllitjn atitcivil action; atidits ofticef$Jtnd empJqyees immune froin suitfo.r any
liabilitf arising .from the performance 9ftheir official duties~

Tribe; or

UL.O.C § l~s ..s. :' 1:he UTERO Ordinf}11ce. does waive sovereign imn.1miityJn certain

· circum.stances. s~htion 13 3,. of the UTERO Ordinance states:

The Tribe l1ere.by agree.s tp waive its sovereign inunµnity for th¢. sole•.an¢t fa)ri~cl
purposeof.t~®)fCt!Ill~nt of: t~~ terms of thisOrdiiumce. This waiver is expressly
limited to jJljµnctive and declaratory relief ·with respect to the enforcement of the
ten11s pfthlsQrdinance aµd does not inc}udemonetruy4amag~s.: This limited ,vai ver
is not, 2.114.should not be construed as ft blanket -w~_iVet of the Tribe,s sovereign
immunity,? Under no circumstances'shall the tribal· funds of the Tribal Treasury be
subject to a11yaward for da.mages·,
•-

(.,,. :•.:.

;

•-

'

.

.

.

-

.

.

--:.

__

.

UTERO Ord~~. Sec~ 13.3. The vvaiver is Hrrfrted to enforc.ement of the UTERO Ordinance only,
.

'

'

'

:;,

and is ,not a hlartk;~ waiver, or wajver for any oth~r p1upo$e. Ute Tenth Cil:cuit Court of'Appeals

f

recentlyinterpret1 this section of'the UTf:RO Ordinance and held:
i

Under the:?terr11,s of that ordi11ance~ tlJe Txibe has irtdee.d 'agreq[d] to M'aive its
sover~ign #nrtturuty/ But the ordinance explains that this iwavier not, ~nd should
tl.Ot be construed11,s·a blan,k~t,,vaiverofthe Trib~'s.spyereign immunity.' lnstea4=,>the.

is

waiver cx\$ts tfo.rJhe.sole andihnited purpose ofenforceme.nt of the ten:ns of[the]
Ordinance· ••• ~- ,'
Ute lndian Tribe.Jfthe1./intahimtl Ow·ayReservation v. lfiate of Utah~ 790 F.3d

1000,,tOJO

~:~

(1Qth.:Cir. 20l5)(q~ntingtJTERQ Ordinanc¢). TheColll'.t fµrthe.r e?(plained:.

..
[E]venass~lroing tvithout grtmtingthat the defendants' counterclaims·could. somehow
Page3of 17
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be d.escrib~d. .as ruteffort to 'enforcet the ordinance~ itself a seriously questionable..
notion -w the 9r,dh1ance is en!or~~able prilj,r. before tdbal court~ t1nd the Tribe~s

{Jl:ERQ Com.mi$~igµ. N?-i¥.h¢.t'e does the \Va.tv~r p;nnit ot.herj,arties to hakdh~
Ttj~e ~efore a 1101ittiha1 tribunal and this cowt enjoys 'no autlitsrity to rewrite for the
defendimts·:the:waiverthe•:tr.ibe, has writtenfotit~eff.
ld~
The :Plai.p1iffs arguetheTrib.e has waived sovereigriim,munity=by the UTEROCode
Section 13.3. Co11~eqµently> the Plaintiff argues -ihat a SP:iiagainsttlie Tribe-can be .maintain~,L
'•t·

.

-

'

.

The Plaintiffs.furlper argue thatt:h~hasis for their Ve.rified Complf;lirit;Js, the aHegatimithat ttie:
'i . .

. ••.

.

Defendants have ~~ted outside the scope ofUTERO and attemptedto c<mduct ille.gal:and

nola,,141 activities outside oflhe 150,undaries ofthe Reservation. The Plaintiffs argue the
:,

))efendru1ts acted \Htra vires ancf th"ir claims do.not implicate the UTEROcride but are
1

i·t

actionable state to~,. statutory~ and constitutional claims. The Plainti:ffi; argue.thatthey are,not
bound to prose<.,ut~: their claims in. tribal court or the before the U'TERO Co1m11.issio.1i.

Whether t~~ Pla.mtiffis attempting to enforce terms ofthe UTERO Ordinance or not, the
. .

t .

:

.

.

.

.

.

.

''

.

tesult:is the satti.e:··ai.s.nxi.ssa.J.:aga:hi~tthe Tribe for la.ck of stibject matter,jurisdiction, Jfthe
Plaintiffs; daims t~~1it1stthe:T1:i~Je..arentftbrought pursuant td the UTERO ()i'dirta11cej·th.en

..

sovereign imnnmi~ applies barring the clahns because there has been no. dear-and express
waiver.9f soverei~r i.rn,;nunity outside of the tert.ns of the UTI3R0 Ordinan¢e. If Plaintiffs'

~·

:

daims are, broughf to enforc.ethe LJTERO Ordinan,ce, thos¢ cfaims must.have been br:qughtin
·; ~
i.

tdba.i qcJµrt. The iatver of sovereign immunity in'the lJTERO Or-dimm~e· exp1~ln$ it is-~'f.or th..e
'

~Ole ,ari,d lin1ite:Q p~ttposc of erifcfrcetnentQf1he terms of [the] ()nltnmtce}'

t1TEFZ9 (.);td.;. Sec~

'

··1

13.3 ~ ·the waiver \~is not). and ~hould not be ~ons.trued as a blahketw~iv~i' of the .Tf,ibe's
~;·~

sovereign :irnitlun1b

1

."

Id~ However~ as explained by the Tenth <tirouit;:=according:to the :UTERO
Page4 of 17
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Ordinance~ the claims can only be brought before the tribal court and the Tribe's UTERO
Commission. lJn~er either scenario, this Court lacks subject matterjurisdiction over the Tribe.
Additionaily; the Plairttif:ts argue the Tribe waived sovereig.n frnm:unity by making a
general appearance in this litigation. Plaintitli;' memorandum .tontainecl J.lO authority for th.is
position but referenced the argument contained in a memorandum filed by them on May 15,
2013. That memorandum also appears devoid of any legal authority for the proposition that a
tribe waives sovereign immunity by making a general appearance in a case. At oral argument,
I

Plaintiffs counsel 'iu-gued that the tribe had made a general appearance in this case by seeking a
dismissal of the entire case forfa.ilure to join an indispensable party. Counsel then provided the
Court with three

c:ases that allegedly support the position.

Those cases had not been cited d1,.1ring

'"

briefing and were ·9bjected to by defense counsel. The Court allowed the cases irt an effort to

include all applic~ble legal authority to assist it in deciding a cornplic~ted case. The Court
authorized defens~ ct1unsel to file a supplemental response to the three cases provided hy
~

Plaintiffs. Defend~ts submitted the supplemental response as allowed by the Cowt on February
5,2016.

On February 8, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that the Court grant leave to
r'

allow full briefing._.ofthe issue of whether the Tribe's sovereign inununity was wived bymaking
~l

.

.

a general appearaqce;< Iris a rnystery to this Court why Plaintiffs believe they should be allowed
"i!

more argument oJ;this point. The Tribe asked for dismissal of the c~se ohthe grounds of
sovereign immuni\y in its motion. The Plaintiffs filed a twenty-page memorandum in response
that included an argument that the Tribe had made a general appearance in this ca:se and that it
*J
i'

had waived sover~ign immunity. Then 1 at oral argument Plaintiffa arguedthat same point and
Page 5 of 17
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the Court allowed-Plaintiffs to present c.ase law that they had not been provided in briefing.
Obviously, Plaintiffs knew waiver of sovereign immunity in any of its iterations was at issue or
they would not have appeared at oral argumen1s armed with case law onthat point. The fact.that
,,,

Plaintiffs failed to fully- brieffueir defenses to the primary issue raised by the Tribe in its 1tiotion

for dismissal is inexplicable. There is no confusion on this point. The Tribe claims it is immune
from suit in state court. The defense to this claim is waiver of immunity. Waiver potentially

occuts in a numb~t of ways.: Any ofthe potentiaJ ways by which'Plai_ntirf claims the Tribe
·r
,vaivcd its immunfty mustbe raised by Plaintiff. Procedurally~ arguments are not made bya
::.

series of separate µiemoranda. Rather, all of a responding pruty' s arguments on a point are
e:xpected to be made in~ single responsive pleading. There is only one reason why any further
,.

briefing was allo,~~dby.the Court foHowing oral argument. Namely, that P'Jaintiffs attempted to
introduce case

la~,:during oral argument

that had not previously been briefed. It ·was only

appropriate that D~fendants be given the opportunity to address case la\.v not previously disclosed
_.,1'

before the Court 1Jade its ruling. That necessary briefing opens no new-doors to Plaintiffs.

Neverthellss the Cotnt has reviewed the cases belatedly cited by the Plaintiffs for the
1

proposition that a ~ribe waives sovereign immunity by making a general appearance in a case and
a discussion of eat~ ishaq below. The Court first notes that subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time\Barnardv.
Wasserman> 855 P.2q243> 247.;48 (Utah 1993)("This courtbas
.....
'

made clear that chtnenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time· and cannot be
:-;

waived by the parties.'').

In Friends- of East "lf7llits Valley v. County of1\rfendocino, 123 C!aL Rptr. 2d 708 711
1

(Cal. Ct. App. 200_2),
under fue heading of H[b]~ckground" the court stat~d:
,,
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In a prior wipublished decision we rejected in:itiaJ c.hallenges to trial courtjurisdiction
over the Tribe, concluding that because the Tribe has made a general appearance, it
waived its sovereign immunity.
Additionally, in th~ ''[d]iscussion'} section of the ruling, the court stated:
Indeed, the Tribe \vaived sovereign immunity previously when it made a general
appearance in this case. It also expressly waived sovereign immw1ity in
connection with enforcement of the Tribal/County Agreement.

Id at 715. Notably, the statement by the Court t,hat the Tribe had waived its sove1·eign
immunity by makH1g a general appearance in the case cites no legal authority for that
i!

position. Thus, whhout fmther explanation, that statement c.arries no ,.veight. The
'

California CourC s\iecision is not c.ontrolling and because it contoJns llO discussion and
cites no authority,;_it cannot be persuasive. It is conceivable that the Tribe expressly
waived immunity b its pleadings when. it appeared in the case, or perhtipsi it sought some
affinnative relief. ) However, because the prior case is unpublished and because the

h

published case oft~rs no authority nor explanation fur the assertion, the case is of no
-f

assistance to this Court~s determination of the issue. Further, the Tribe in Friends ofEast

Willits Valley exp:~essly waived its sovereign inununity ,~.:hen it entered into aspedfic
tribal/county agreernent that was at issue in the lawsuit. Thus~ in the face of an express
waiver contained in the \\'Titten agreement, it is difficult to determine how much
,;

c<)nsideration was"_given to the issue ofvv·aiver by general appearance or whether the two
!~~
:.q_,

·were one in the san'ie in that instance.

Next, the ~:laintiffs cite Nushake! Inc. v, State Comp. Ins. Fund, No. CGC-05441299, 2011 ca{Super, LEXIS 319, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 29: 2011). Jr1 Nushake,
"

the c.ourt held that· the tribe waived. sovereign immunity by diti;!ctly and unequivocally
Page 7 of 17
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consenting to enforcement of thc·settlement agreement in California State Court.. Id. at
**J.5..;40. Nushak¢ 's holding, therefore, is unhelpful in this case because the Ute Tribe

has not similarly cpnsented to enforcement of any agreement here at issue in Utah State
Court

Finally, the Plaintiffs cite United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1981 ).

In Oregon, the Yakima Tribe moved to intervene in a lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a)(2j. The Oregon Court held thtlt because the tribe had intervened in. the
case it had ac;sumed the status of an original party and was fully bound by all future court

orders. See, id a/1014. The holding in Oregon is logical because one who intervenes in
a. case is seeking to. pursue a claim or to defend a particular position voluntarily. An
intervenor is iden#cal to an original plaintiff Plaintiffs and infotvenors arcdn any
particular case because they consent to be in the case. Whether a plaintiff or intervenor,

they affinnatively ~ought to be a party. \Vere the Ute Tribe to bring an action in state

,,
court as a pfaintiff, or were it to intervene~ an argu:ment that it had waived immunity

...

could easily be made. The Ute Tribe in the present case did not voluntarily intervene,
rather, it is an inv~luntary defendant in the action. Thus, the holding in Oregon has no
bearing on this co·urt's dedsi.on.

The Ute T~ibe has only sought to. have this case dismissed against it b.ased on its
spvetcign immuni~. Additionally the Tribe has asked the case not go forward against
;_,

any defendant because the Tribe claims to be a1iecessary and indispensable party. The

facts of this cased~ not parallel any of the cases-the Plaintiffs have cited in: support of
.

th~ir argument

'

tha! soveteigi1 immunity can be waived by a general appearance. Nor do
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the cases cited by the :Plaintiffs suppmt the conclusion that a general appearance waives

the sovereign immµnity of a tribe.

TI. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
Next, the Defendants argue in the alternative, that the Plaintifl:S.~ Verified

Complaint should'be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
t

UTERO Ord.inande r~quires the Plaintiffs to file a written com.plaint with the UTERO

Commission prior~:to filing sui.t. The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs failed to do this
prior to filing the Verified Complaint
The Court will not decide this issue. Th.e Court has already granted the Tribe's
~)

Motion to Dismiss,making this issue moot Because this Court does not have
jurisdiction over the Tribe; whether or not the Plaintiff adhered to the re-quirements of the
UTERO Ordinance in bringing their claims is of 110 consequence to this Court. This
i

Cou.rt would not have
jurisdiction over the Tribe even if the Plaintiffs had exhausted their
·).
....
i.

administrative ren~~dies. Additionally, the tribal court, if necessary, is better situated to
\

determine if the P)~intiffa followed their procedures under the UTERO Ordinance.
III. Necessary and Indispensable Party.

Finally, th~ Defendants argue the entire- Verified. Com.plaint must be dismissed as
t() all defendants

pursua.rit to Rule l 2(b)(7) because the Tribe is immu:rte .from suit and is a
t ~-

necessary and indEspensable party under Rule 19.
Determinitigjoinder of a party under rule 19 requires the courtto potentially make
a three step analy~is. Fir$t, the court must detennine whether a party is necessary. Grand
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County v. Rogers, 44 P.Jd 734~ 740 (Utah 2002). Next, the court must detem1ine that
joinder of the necess::.iry party is feasible. Id. at 741. Finally, if the party is necessary and

jo~nqer is 11ot feasible, the courtmustdetermine whether the party is indispensable. Id.
Rule 19(a)'. of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part that a party is

necessary if:
(1) in his absen~ cp01plete relief cannot be. accorded among those already parties,
or (2) he claims a..n,:fnterestrelatingto :the, subject of the action and is so situated that
the dispositioi°f1)ftpe. action in his absence niay (i) as a practical rnatter impair or
impede hi~ ability to P.r.·.otect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsisteW obligations by reason of his claimed interested.
~'The basic purpose of rule 19 is 'to protect the interests of absent persons as well as those

alreaqy before the·court from multiple litigaticm or inconsistent judic'ial determinations."'
Landes v, City Capital Bank 795 P2d I 127) l: 130 (Utah 1990); quoting 7 Charles A .
..
Wright, Arthur R.;:Mmer & Mary K. Kane: Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d
3

§1602, at21 (1986).

The Plaintfffs generally allege the Ute Tdb(; and the Tribe:s govc.munental
representatives ha;e acted beyond the authority of the UTE.RO Ordinance and have
committed torts against the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs insist that their claims do not rely on
;i:

the UTERO Ordirl.hnce butare simple state tort, statutory, and c.onstitutional law claims.
The Plaintiffs claifo the individual tribal representatives acted in their official capacities~
although ultra vir~_s, to commit wrongful acts against the Plaintifts. Paragraphs 11, 12,
13, and 14 of Piah{tiff•i prayer for relief in the Amended Verified Complaint requests that
the Court enjoin tlie Ute Tribe and UTERO officials from actions that interfere \\1th
,.

l)laint1.ff.~'.abilities':to conduct: business. Paragraph 11 asks the Conritq enjoin the Tribe
C
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andUTERO officiais from regulating Plaintiffs' business activities in a manner that
exceeds tribal autl~ority. Paragraph 12 asks for a:ri injunction against wrongful

interference with Plaintiffs·' relationships with oil and gas companies. In. part, paragraph
13 seeks to enjoin:retalia.tion against Plairttifrs. And paragraph 14 seeks to enjoin
retaliation againsfoil and gas companies that do business with Plaintiffs.
The Court must first detennine whether the Tribe is a necessary party within the
i~

meaning ofU.R.C:P~ 19. The inquiry is whether the Tribe claims an interest relating to
'1

the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in its absence
may as a practical-matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest.
Any subs~tive analysis of the Plaintiffs' tort claims against UTERO otlicials
Would require the:Court tomake specific determinations regarding the ability of' the Tribe
to regulate tribal ~:usiness relationships. For example. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
i•:

alleges that UTER.b officials told Defendant Newfield that if Ne1A-field utilized Plaintiffs'
products or services, Nev.field would be perialized and/or sanctioned to the fullest extent
oftribal law. Plaintiffs characterize the Tribe's action in sending the cornm.unication as
-1=

threatening, intim1cfating~ retaliating, wrongful, etc. In order for the Court enjoin UTERO
,,

'

(

offidals, and thereby enjoin the 'fribe, from '\vrongfully interfering in Plaintiffs'
"

relationship with 9-:n and gas companies/' the. Court would nooessarily be required to
detetmine whether the Tribe and its officials have ~uthority to give such a directive to
Newfield and/or

to other oil and gas companies, In essence, the question is whether the
'

Tribe, through its 9fficials may tell a company that the company may be _precluded from
1

:.,•;

operating on tribal)andsifthat company continues to engage in business wifu a particular
f\
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individual or company. It seems apparent that a determination about whether the Tribe
and its officials m~y issue directives Jelating to oil companies' business activities, such as
the·directi.ve alleg#d to have been issued in this case, is a critical iuterestof:the Tribe;
Further, injunctions against UTERO officials prohibiting them from issuing such
directives effectiv~ly serves as an injunction against th.e Tribe from issuing those
directives. The Court finds that such a disposition in this case, in the Tribe's absence,
;·!

may a.s aJlractical)nattcr:im.pair or impede the Tribe, s ability to protect that interest.
n

Therefore, the Tribe is a nec.essary party to this action.
However, ~ outlined above, this Court lacks subject mutter jurisdiction over the

Tribe, makingjoinder not fe.asible, Therefore, Rule 19(b) applies, and the Cow:t must
f·

detennine \Vhethe(theTribeis indispensable. Rule 19(b) states:
i,

If a person· described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the
court shall~ detenhine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed an1ong the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being
thus regar~ed as :in.,dispeusable. The factors to be considered by the court include:

first, to wh1;1t extent ajttdgtnent rendered iu the person: s absence might be prejudicial
to him or those already parties; second, the .extentto ·which) by prptective provisinn.s
in the judgment, by tlle.<shaping of relief~ or other measure, the preJudice can be
lessened o~ avoid~d; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person1 s absence ,1vill
be adequat~; fourth, whether the p1aintiff,;\rill have an adequate remedy if the action
is dismiss1d for nonjoinder.
In determiping whether a judgment rendered in the Tribe,s absen.ce might be
prajudi~ia.l to the!-ribe,.the discussion above dearly itnplicatesa probEtl,ilityofprejudice
;,i-:

to the Tribe. Plaifitiffs
seekinjunctions that would require the.Tribe's 6-fficials to cease
s.'
,·

sending letters to

ff

pil and gas companies telling the companies that they face sanctions

under the UTERC\Ordimmce if they coniinue to utilize.Plaintiffs' products and services.
A determination b;· th~ Courtthat the 1.JTERO oflicials' ad of sending the directive to
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Ne\vfield \:vas wro~igful is potentially prejudicial to the Tribe. .An injunction against tribal
;

offic.ials is effectively an i.PJunction against the Tribe. Such an injunction might limit the
Tribe's ability to issue directives h deems necessary under tlle UTERO Ordh1a.nce and
1

could be prejudicial to the Tribe's ability to regulate its affairs, Potentially, depending
1

upon the Tribe s i~1terpretations of its own laws, the Tribe could ban any person or
company from doing business on Tribal ground for any reason. A judgment rendered by

this C()tnt in the Thbt's absence th<1tpu.ivortsto limit the Tribe's 8:bilify to sanction o,r
exclude businesse~~ from Tribal property for the reasons stated in the alleged

..
communication in.this case creates a significant potential for prejudice against a key
,.

interest in tribal s~If~governance.

Next, none of the parties have suggested howthe Court could shape the relief or
H

enter protective provisions in the judgment that would lessen or avoid the prejudice
,.

described above. Neither can the Court conceive of any. Nearly all of the Plaintiffs'
requests for relie(~k for injunctions against the Tribe and UTERO officials.

Conceptually: the Court cannot see how it could trrant any version of the re-liefrequestcd
,.
\

that would not prejudice the Tribe.
,

Further, tlie Tribe and the UTERO officials are the key figures in this action. It is
·t

their alleged actio~s that constitute Plaintiffs' prim.ary contention ohv.rongdoing. A
.

~.
(

judgment. against the other Defendantsi vfi.thout the injunctions against the Tribe and its
'

:·:

UTERO officials as demanded by Plaintifts would seem to be an inadequate remedy.
1

Finally, th~ Plaintiffs have another for~'Tl to address their claims other tha11 in the
State Court. Plaintiffs could have ·raised their daims through tribal administrative
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procedures and perhaps in the Tribal Court. The Plaintiffs argue that the Tribal Court is

not .neutral or fair.:_-The Court sees such an allegation, without any factual basis~ no
differently than if,Plaintiffs claimed the State's district or justice courts. were:i1iherently

biased against a p,{rticular class of parties.
The case cpntains claims. which directly involve the Tribe's interests. The Tribe is
immune from suit; and resolving the claims witl10utthe Tribe~s presence would impair
I

their ability to pro~ect fh11t interest Consequently, the Tribe is a necessary and
indispensable partyto this action.
1;

DefcndaneNewtield has also sought dismissal for failure to join and indispensable
1,

party and that motion is best addressed here. Although similar, the neGessary and
{

indispensable analysis with regard to Newfield does merit some additional discussion.
Rule 19 states that a party is a necessary party if "he claims an interest relating to the
;

i;

subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may ..• (ii) leave iit1y of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple~ or Qtherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interested."
The question then becomes whether a disposition of this actioniri the absence of

the Tribe would l~ave Ne\\-field subject to a substantial risk of incon,sistent ohligations by
n

.

.

reason of the Tribe's claim.e:d hJterest The Tribe~ s claimed interest-is its ability to
I

regulate business a:ctivity on tribal lands. That ability to regulate business activity might
n

include issuing diriectives to oil and gas companies and imposing sanctions on c.ompanies
fornot abiding by}he Tribes directives. One potentfal disposition of this action is that
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the Court find Newfield liable for one or more of the causes of action claimed by
Plaintiffs and grant damages against Newfield. Simultaneously, because the Court has no
sul~ect matter juri~diciion over the Tribe to restrain the T1foe from any action relating to

the direc.tives it se4ds to oil and gas companies relating to business activities on triha]
lands, and because· the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to control the other means
the Tribe uses to enforce its directives, Newfield could become subject to inconsistent

obligations in Staie Court and before the UTERO Commission. If Newfield fails to abide
by the directives

ot.' UTERO in an effort to avoid state legal claims that may be brought by

Plaintiffs, Newfiefd may be subject to sanctions imposed by the Tribe. Likewise, if
I'"

NeVvfield follows the directiyes of fffERO in an effort to maintain its status with the
t.t

Tribe, to continue~its ability to operate on tribal lands. and to avoid tribaLsanctions,
,:

Newfield may verj,· conceivably be subject to further civil sanctions in State Court.
Thus, disposition of this case in the Tribe's absence may leave Nevlfield subject
._;

;

to a substantial ri~k of incurring inconsistent obligations. In this context; the Tribe is a
,.'

necessary party to 'the action.
l.

W:hether the Tribe is an indispensable party from Newfield's perspective also
~.

merits additional discussion. Again, Rule l 9(b) requires the Court to consider: (1) to v.;hat

extent a judgmen.t}endered in the. Tribe's absenc,e might be. prejudicial to Newfield; (2)

the extent to which,· the prejudfoe can be lessen¢d or avoided; (3) whether a judgment
.(

rendered in the Tribe's absence will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff will have an
i

adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
As discuss:~d above, a judgment rcnderedfa the Tribe's absence has significant
.~
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potential to prejudice Ne\vfiel.d. A 111.ouey judgment against Newfield is not simply a
sin.gl~ judgment. In the Tribe's absence, Neivfield c<Juld potentially be faced with a
decision to risk furth.erjudgments in state coutj, face sanctions wiih the U'TERO

commission~ or cease its operations ·relating to tribal lands altogether. Because of the
potential for incon~istentjudgments between the state courts and the UTERO

com.mis.sion, Newfield is placed in the untenable position of operating in potential
;j

violation of incon~istent directives from courtsoftwp. jurisdictio11s.
I

TI1e

Court ~ha5 been. offered no solution to lessen or avoid this potential prejudice

and; again, cannofconceive of any manner by which it could create a ruling that would
solve- the potentiaLprejudfoe potentially caused by Newfield being subject to conflicting
~'·

and inconsistent 01~dersfrom. this Court. and from the OTERO Commission.
Factors rel~ting to the indispensable status of a party numbered 3 and 4 are no

different in the context of Newfield 1 s position than they are in regard to the Tribe's
positjon and need not be reiterated here. Conse.quently, the Tribe is a necessary and

indispensable party to this action.
I

( the foregomg:
.
Based upon
'c/

L The P{aintiffs' Motion for Leave to Brief, for Clarification of Order, and

Rc;lated Relief is d~nied.
.1

2. The Tribe's moti:on to dismiss the Tribe for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

is granted.
3. The Tribe,s Motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party is
granted.

Page 16 of 17

001772
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM PAGE 18

..,..,..
.

•·

.•.

4. 'Newne_lg;:5J,fotion
tq dismiss forfailure fojoin an -indispensable. party is
·1.
.
'
'.
gt:artted,

.. . . . .P~!<!i!·

j=

,;1

tl)isi2t

~pfJ\w'<:1',2.0lli,

•,•s:

')·

,.

,

;,,.
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lN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
fl\T AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

RULING AND ORDER

Ryan Uresk Harvey, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation,. e.t al.,
)-

Case No. 130000009

Judge SAMUEL P. CHIARA

Defendants.

________________ ________________
__.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss A.1:nended Verified
Complaint
The Defendants are divided into three groups, each represented by different counsel. The
Defendants making this Motion include Nc\v.field Production Company, Newfield Rocky
'

I

Mountains, Inc., l'{ewfield R~H, LLC, and NeV11field Drilling Services, Inc. ("Newfield"). Mr.
Christopher R.Hogle represents these Defendants. The Defendants Ute Indian Tribe of the
,,

Uintah and Ouray.Reservation ("Tribe"), LC. Welding & Construction, Inc., and Huffman

Enterprises, Inc., are represented by l'vlr. J. Preston Stieff. The Defendants D. Ray CeBspooch,
·(°

Sheila Wopsock, and Jackie La.Rose, in their individual capacities, and as representatives of the
'
k

Ute Indian Tribe, and LaRose Construction Company, Inc., and D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C., are
-t·~

re1>resented by Mr. Joel T. Zenger. The Plaintiffs are represented by counsel. Mr. John Hancock,
Mr:. Clark Allred, ~and Mr; Brad Brother$on.
Page 1 of 8
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The Court heard mal argument on this Motion and on motions of the other Defendants,
1

on January 29, 2016. Oral argumeni was provided. from all of the parties on each of the Motions.

The issues ·were taken under advisement. After careful review of the pleadings, the arguments,
and the relevant cii.se law,·the Court is prepared tornle on the issues.
Initially

1

th.e Court. notes that based on the Ruling and Order on the Ute Tribe's Motion to

Dismiss, this matt~r is a.lso dismissed against the Nervfield Defendants. The Court found thatthe

Ute Tribe was a ncce.ssaty and indispensable party to this action. However,,, the Ute Tribe is
immune from suit Co11sequentl.y, the matter cannot be maintained against Nevlfield either. The
,L

Court adopts that decision here. While that decision makes the additional arguments moo~ the
:·1:;

Coutt will address· the additional arguments as an altemativc basis to dismiss the Amended.
r,;

Verified Complaini.
i~

The Defendants move the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint pursuant to
Rule l 2(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule 12(b)(6) defense is a challenge to
the plaintiffs right to relief based on the facts the plaintiff has alleged in the complaint. Russell
".':

{.~

v. Standard Corp., 898·P.2d263 (Utah 1995),
<

The court reviews a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to detenuine whether the plaintiff would be
entitled to relief urtder any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claims. Heiner

v. S.J Groves & S~ns Co.;. 790 l',2d 107 (Utah Ct App. 1990). The coµrt must "accept the
factual allegation~' ht the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be
\t

drawn from them :i;n the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'' Alvarez v. ·Galetka, 933 P.2d 987;
989 (Utah 1997). _:,

't11o sup~~rt a claim for reliet a plaintiff 'must have alleged sufficient facts ... to
Page 2 of 8
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satisfy eac-11 eleme~1t' of a claim." Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 2013 UT App 26, ~ 16, 296 P.3d
760 (quoting MBNA Am. Bank NA. v. Goodman, 2006 UT /\pp 276, ,I 6, L40 P.3d 589. "[W]hen
the pleader complaitts ofconduct described by .•. general terms ..• , the.allegation of the
conclusion is not siifticient; the pleading must describe the nature or substance of the acts or
words c.omplained of.n Tflifliams v. State Farm Ins. Co.,, 656 P.2d 966~ 971 (Utah 1982).
H[ G]enera1 accusations in the nature of conclusions ... will not stand up against a motion to
.':c

dismiss." Heath111;cm v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah I 962); UtahSteel & Iron Co. v. Bosch,
475 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 1970).
Vi

The Plai.nt~ffs allege that the Newfield Defendants have conspired with the other
~i

Defendants to boycott or blacklist the Plaintiffs' business. The Plaintiffs claim the Newfield

,.
Defendants are liable for tortious interference with economic relations:, extortion, unlav.rful
I'

restraint of trade, blacklisting, and civil conspiracy. The factual allegations the Plaintiffs rely on
..

to support their claims against Newfield are made in paragraphs 70-74 in the Amended Verified

Complaint, "vhich. state-s;
70. Sincf the March 20, 2013, threats by Director Wopsock, the oil and g;:is
companies; including Newfield, have refused to allow any business \Vho leases
Plaintiffs' ;equipment or utilizes Plaintiffs' Products to provide services .
.;.

71. By en~·ail dated March 22, 2013 1 Newfield informed Ryan that it would not be
utilizing tJaintiffs 1 products or services per the direction of the "UTERO
committee/'
~._,...

72. Newfield'$ and other oil and gas companies' cooperation wifu the unlawful an.ct
ultra vires actioiis of tribal officials empowers said officials and is the direct and
proximate·:cnuse of damages to Plaintiffs .
.,
73. Since ~March 2013, Plaintiffs' bave lost approximately $80,000.00 per day in
revenues r;~ the result of Newfield and other oil and gas compank~s cooperating in
the unla\\'i}tl.U'TER.6bl~cklist and boycott of Plaintiffs.
·
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74. Ryan l_las been contacted by oil and gas companies, including Newfield, and
told that they cannot do business with Plaintiffs or work with anyone that does
business with Plaintiffs based on their cooperation with and suppo1t of the
UTERO officials.
The Plaint1ffs also submitted attachments to a Motion for Temporarj Restraining Order
which was filed at,_the satne time as the original Complaint. The attachments concern
.,

communications tliat UTERO had with Newfield <)onceming Rocks Off; and Newfield,s
notification to Pla#1tiffthat Newfield would no longer be utilizing the Plai.ntiff onjobs. The
,I.

lf·

.

parties referencedJhese attachments in the subseqtient motions. Although foundation was never
provided for the d6cuments) none of the parties obje.cted to the attachments on an evidentiary
l

1

basis. Nor did any; of the parties oppose the Court s consideration of the attachments in
(?Onjunction with ~edding the Motions.
r~

The March,20, 2013, UTERO letter notified Newfield that the acce-ss pem1it for Rocks
,f}

Off, Inc. - Ryan lfarvey had been revoked. The letter indicated that companies doing business
I•

Oll the reservation;may

be penalized or sanctioned for using Rocks Off, Inc. - Ryan Harvey. In

I

response to the letter, a representative of Ne'A-iiekl.-not:ified Ryan Harvey byemai.l that Newfield.

would not be using RocksOff~ Inc., due to the UTERO directive.
t.

The facts set forth in the Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint establish, at most, that
...

Newfield was not{fied by UTERO that Rocks Off's access pe1mit had been revoked and were no
,i

l,

longer authorized .'to conduct work on tribal land, ari.d that Newfield follo\ved that dire,ctiv~ by no
longer utilizing Rocks Off for work on tribal land. Those minimal factual allegations fail to
support the variotts claims the Plaintiffs set forth~ The facts do not supporta finding that
\;,

Newfield. and the piher Defendants cmne to a meeting of the minds to·ha.rtnthe Plaintiffs'
;

...~.

;,:
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business. The facts do not supporta claim that Newqeld agreed to assist in harming the
•

i

Plaintiffs' busines~. The complaint must give tl1e detendant "fair notice of the nature and basis

or gtot!nds of the claim..• ." Zoumadakis v, Uintah ct.sin Med. Ctr., 2005 UT App 325, 12, 122
P.3d 891. The factual allegations made against New e.ld fail to provide adequate

notk:e. of the

actions complaine<;l of. For that reason, and for tbe 1.1 sons listed below~ the Defendant

Newfield's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
:~

l.

"
Tortious lQ.ter.fe:renc:e
with Ec-0nomic.Rela:tio s.
The eleme~ts of a claim for tortious interfere ce with economic relations include "'( 1) that

the defendant inte~1tionally interfered with the plainti

s existing or potential economic relations,

(2) for an impropir purpose or by improper means, ( ) causing injw-y tQ the plaintiff" Leigh
(1

'

'''

. '

' ''

; .

.

Furniture & Carp<?-t Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 ( tah 1982). The Plaintiffs allege that the
~

.

.

Defendants "havdntentiorially interfered with the Pl intiff..<;' existing and potential economic
;_

li

relations." (Am. Comp!.,
at\ 117.). The Plaintiffs d,: not provide any explanation of the
.. ,
...':

Defendants' actioAs or facts to support their claim. " G]eneral accusations in the nature of

conclt1sions ... will not stand up against a motion to dismiss." Heathttian. 13 Utah 2d at 268,
372 P,2d at 991. The aUegations are insufficient to provide the Defendants fair notice of the
•·
.
I
actions complaine~ of. Therefore, the Plaintiffs'

a
i

dismissed.

IL

.id Claim for Reliefagainst Newfield is

Extoliion. i.
'

Utah does not recognize a civil claim for ext rtion. See Jensen v. America ·s W110lesale

Lender, Case No. :1 :09-cv-169 TS, 2010 WL 272074~ (D. Utah July 8,201 O)(unpublished); see
,

!

'.

PAK,
2011 WL 4368568 *17 (D. Utah
I

j

<

I

also W11ipple V. State qfUtah) Case No. 2:l0Mcv;..811
,.
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i\Ugr 253 2011.)(Report an(}

Rec9rnmendation)(llllf)Ublislled)('~ums,
be_ca,µ~e apriva.t~right
of
.
. .
.
.

'

action do.es not exi~t fo Utah 10.rtheft and theft by extortion, ·1tn::,cqurttecom;tn~hc.ls;that
.Plaintift"-s third ca~~e ofaction [fof;.textortion,'] be-dismissed;'~). Conseq_uentlyi the Plah1tifts'

Fourth,Claim for llelieffnr-e.xtortiori is dismissed.
IIL

AntitnistClaim~

The PJaintiffs allege-in. the-it Fifth Claitn for Relief tha.Hhe Def~n.~ai1ts conspired wi~b the
;.~-"

othetDefendants h;i:vi.olation <:,f Ofah~s Antitrust Act and the UtahX!onst. Art. XII~§ 20. The
L

.· . .

.

lJtal.l. AntitnistAct-:explic~t}y adopts and follows interpretations of federal antitrost1aws, Ste §
t

76.. 10-3J 18~ ·A viplatron ofthe Sherman Act ~"requires tl1atthere be. a contract, combination ...
p

ot conspiracy ••. \ [i]ndcpe.ndentactionis not proscribed/~ ,Section 76-10~3104 ofthe Utah

Anti.trust Act reqll!res that . t[e]very contract~ combination in the fonn oftrust or otherwise: or
il

conspiracy in restt~nt oftrade or commerce is declared to be illegal." A claim. for violation. of·
;.

/·

the antitrust laws ~~quires,pleadirtg facts sho'wJng a concerted 0{1urt: among'the d~foµdaq.t§~
'

[

Utah,the facts must support~(~ 'meeting of the minds'
.

.

. .

Qrt a COlllln:Qn

.

.

;Tn

.

cobjeqt-or course of,

:r

action/'fTamlins~~' 2013 :Ut App 26 at 1[ 19.(quotiug Petersen v. Delta Air Line.rt lire;~ 2002.UT
(i.

App 56;4J 12A2 P.3d 1253.
The Plaintiff:4; ofter no facts alleging-thatNew:fietd arni ·the other Defendants had a
H
.

fneeting ofthe m~ds to boycott the Plairitiffa' business. All that is alleged is UT.ERO informed
·<

~-'

Newfield thatthe :R,qck_s ()ff was no longer allowed to tiop.dii¢tJ:msiriess o:n. b.jbaUarid, aµ:d

,,.
Newfield relayed the message to the Plaintiffs ·ex:plaiuing that Nevmeld ·was nofgoing
to. do:
.. .

.
bµ_sJn:ess \VJ.th Pla,ihtiffs duet•
•;:

'

,

the 1)TERO notice~ The Plaitttfffs' -claim merely recites the.

eleme11ts o.f an. antitrust<!l~in1. '~(A]

com.plaint fa sulijectfo di~:rni.ssalwlwre it doe.s: little 111ore
Page6p.f 8
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:than iec.ite the rel~vant•antitrustlawsn and 1'the tise pfantit:rtt~tbuzz wotdsdoes .notsupplx the
•fa~1uaLcircumsta:rices necessary to support c<.mdttsoryall~g,ijJions~" Tat·v~ Hogan, 453 F.:3._d

l 244r J:?61(10th Cir. 7006). The Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim ftit Relief against Newfield is disrnissed,
V.

Blacklisting
The Plaihtfffs ~·claim for blacklisting is derived from Article. XII § 19 and Article XVI § 4

of:ihe t.Jtah C(mstitution. AuticleXII § l 9 provides:
,.,
Eachperso.nin Uta1lis free·to obtain m,1d e.nJoy employment: \.vhenevtr pos~ible a:n.d
a person ot~orporatlon, 9r their agent, serv~t,, pr employee may no,t rnalicio11~ly
interfere w;r,th ·any person from obtaining employment or enjoying ernp!Qyment from
any other P.?tson or corporation.
·:

~

Artfole.,:\.\11 § 4 stAttes:
:.~
"..

The exchange of bl~ck lists by railroad companies, or other corporations,
associatio1is cir persons is prohibited.

The Plaintiffs Am~·nded. Verified ·complaint fails to a!.lege fapts conceniing the exchange of
i ~-.
~r

blacklistst or malig1ous interference with I}taintiffs' emplO)'nient, on the part of Newfield. The
r-.~

plead.Ja.cts allege '.~ewfietd. receiyed an cmailfrom UTERO conccrning·Rocks Off: and in
compHance with t~e UTERO Or<l.inance govemit1g work done on tribal•grotinds} Newfield no
~

.

longer -u.sed Rock~~-1C)ff as a contractor or subcontractor. The facts.allege thatN<:n-Vfield follo;.ved
~

'

}

the dir~c.tion ofU1:'I1;RO. by not using the Plair1tiff for \vo:rk qom,pleted: g~_tfjbal land .b.e¢a11se the

Plaintiff was no 16-hger licensed to do wo.rk on.triballand. The Plaintiffs~ cause.ofactfonlor
i'f·

blaqk:li:$ti.ng is d:i.s.1µ,issed.
!:,.

IV.

Civil Con~~iracy
11

A civil•co1ispif:acy c.lain1requires ·''(1) a.combinatiQn.oftwo.or.more•persons; (2}an.
qbject..to he acyi-'~1~plisried" '(3) a:me¢.ti11g ofthe minds {1rt the object or c6urse f>f° ac=tioil, '.(4)_ on:e (1r
Page ?of 8
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more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof/' ~Kwrada v. Mendoza,
2012 UT App 82, _'if 13, 275 PJd 1024; 1029. A civil conspiracy claim alsoqtequir1~.s as one its

essential elements{tU1deilying tortt and "a plaintiffis obligated tu plead the.~xistence ofsuch a
tort.'' Id. The Plaintiffs Anlended Verified Complaint does notallege any facts concerning an
underlying tort. Nbr have the Plaintiffs alleged any facts showing Newfield and the other

Defendants crone to a meeting of the minds to commit an unlawful act against the Plaintiffs.
Therefore, the P1aintiffs Seventh Claim for Relief .is dismissed.
>,<i

The Ne\\rfield Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.

Dated this

i;J:l{_ day ofMarch, 2016.
,·

f

BYTHE COURT:

J
1/17 :,_·
~~~

SAt\.fCJEL P. CI--IIARA~ District Court Ju~ge
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IN THE .EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JN AND FOR DUCHESNE.COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

RULING AND ORDER

Ryan Uresk Harvey, et al.,
Plaintiffs.
vs.

Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation, et al.,

Case No. 130000009

)

Judge SA..\.fUEL :p. CHIARA

Defendants.

This matter is bef'ore the Court on the Defendants; Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint.

The Defendants are divided into three groups, each represented by different counsel. The

Defendants making this Motion include D. Ray Cesspooch. Sheila Wopsock, and Jackie LaRose~
("individual Defe?:dants") in their individual capacities, and as representatives of the Ute Indian
Tribe. and LaRose Construction Company, Inc., and D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. These
r
Defondants are represented by Mr. Joel T. Zenger. The Defendants Ute Iridian Tribe of the
l

Uintah and Ouray·ReservaJion ("Tribe"), L.C. Welding & Constructionr lnc.• and Huf.finan

Enterprises) Inc.,

are represented by Mr. J. Preston Stieff. Defendants Newfield Production

Company, Newfield Rocky MoW1tains, lnc., Nev.rfield RlvII, LLC, and Ne\:v:field Drilling

,,
Servkes, Inc., arec'n::presented by Mr. ChristopherR.Hogle. The Plaintiffs are represented by
·;:·

counsel, Mr. John Hancock, Mr. Clark Allred, and Mr. Brad Brotherson,
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001784
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben30
Clark Law School, BYU.
ADDENDUM
PAGlE
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Court heard oral argument on this Motion, arid on the motions of the other
Defendants, on January 29, 2016. Oral argument was provided from all of the parties on each of
the Motions. The issues were taken under advisement. After careful revieiv of the pleadings, the
arguments, and th~ relevant case law, the Court is prepared to rule on the issues.
The individual Defendants offer many of the same firguments made by the Tribe in th~ir
Motion to Dismiss: The Court adopts the Ruling and Order on the Tribe's }.1.otion to Dismiss in
r

as far as the two ~1otions overlap. Specifically~ the Court finds that the Tril,e is a necessary and
r,

indispensable parij:• which is immune from suit Consequently, the case is dismissed for that

reason, as well as the additional reasons listed be.low. The Com1's Ruling :m.d Order here \vil1
address the argun{euts the individual. Defendants offer that diffel' from the Tribe's.

I.

d

.

D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose Construction.

The Plainfitis have asserted claims against D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaR.ose
!

:l

Co.n..;;truction, apart from the claims made against the. businesses' owners~ Defendants Dino Ray
·,

Cesspooch and Jackie La.Rose. 'To support a. claim for relief, a plaintiff '.t.nust have alleged
suffidentfocts ... to satisfy each element' of a claim.,, Tomlinson v. NCKCorp., 296 P.3d 760
(Utah App. 2013) ~uperseded on other grounds 2014 UT 53,345 P.2d 523 (Utah 2014)(quoting
\

fvfBNA Am. B(lnk

.~

kA. v. Goodman, 140 P.3d 589, 591 (Utah App. 2006)). The Plaintiff.,'

•:

Amended Verifie,t Complaint does not assert any facts supporting th~ claims made against these
:::~
f'.

two corporate Def~ndants. The Amended Verified Complaint only alleges .facts regarding the•

'·
individual Defendants'
actions as individuals and as govemment officials of the Tribe.
Consequently, the~Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be grant€;:d ~gainst
'

these two corporate Defendants. The Amended Verified Complaint is disn:rissed pursuant to

',
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I

li

Rule l2(b)(6) for the Defendants D, Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose Construction.
IL

Dino Ray Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose~and Sheila Wopsock.

The next i$sueJs wliether suit can be maintained against the individual Defendants, or if
sovereign immunity bats.:the suit. The Plaintiffs' claims are brought against the individual
Defendants both in their individual capacity and intheir capacity as governmental officials of the
Tribe. The Defenqants:argu,e sovereign hnrn.unity applies to them as government officials of the
C~

Tribe. The Plaintilfs f¼tguethat sovereign immunity docs notapply because the actions taken by
1·

the officials were outside the scope of their governmental authority.
:;.-

The Ute Tribe's sovereign immunity does not apply to the individual Defendants acting in
f

their individual capacities. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game ofState of1flash.~ 433 U.S.
l65, J 73, 97 S.

ct 2616) 2621 (l977)("[t]he successful asserti<)nof tribal sovereign immunity in

this case does nodmpairthe authority of the state court to adjudicate the rights of the individual
!~

11

defendants over \~~om it properly obtained personal jurisdiction.'l In Maxwell v. Cty. ofSan
Diego, the 9th Cir~~it considered whether paramedics employed by the Viejas Band's fire
;,

r'

department were immune from suit for actions committed by the para.medics in their individual
capacities. 708 F:3d l 075, 1089 (gth Cir. 2013). The cou1t held sovereign immunity did not bar
the suit against th~=pararnedics individually because the tribe was not the real party in interest,

.,~.;
i

and money damages
wm;dd not be .paid from the tribal treaslll'y. Id.
-~
(

,:

\J.

The determining factor in deciding whether a tribe's sovereign immunity extends to the
,'.l

tribe's govemmen~ officials is whether the sovereign "is the real, substantial party in interest/~

Frazier v. Simmo~s~ 254 F.3d 1247, 1253 (10 th Cir. 2001). \Vhether a tribe is the real party in
interest is decided,by looking at the reliefsought. id. ~'[T]he general ndeisthat relief sought
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nominally against ~n officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree ,.vould operate against
the latte.r." J>ennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 900 (1984) .
.·,

Converseh', soveriign immunity does not bar the suit if the relfofsought is only againstthe
individual tribal officer personally. A.Iden v..Maine, 527 U.S. 706: 757!, 119 S.Ct. 2240 {10th cir.
2008).

Here, the relief sought by the Plaintiffs indicates that the Ute Tribe·is the real party in
interes.t. The Plaii{tiffs seek declaratory relief against the Tribe, UTERO; and. the UTERO
·1.

officials. The Plaintiffs request the Court issue a declaratory order limiting the Tribe> UTERO,

and UTERO o.ffici-,~s from regulating private business activities of non-Indians outside of the
f

tribal land. ·n1is type of re]ief directly involves the Tribe,, not the individual Defendants
personally. The Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Tribe, UTERO~ and UTERO

officials, from acting in a ·way which interferes with the Plaintiffs' business. Again, this type of
reliefonly applies!to the Tribe and the Tribe's officials and not the individual Defendants. The
~ :.

i:

relief Plaintiffs are seeking is against the Tribe. Therefore, the Tribe is the real party in interest

and sovereign imrt}unity
also applies to the individual Defendants.
,;'
t•,

Even assuming that the individual Defendants are being sued in their individual
capacities, and the Plaintiffa were not seeking damages from. the Tribe, tbe case must still be
1,

d1smissed. The Piaintiffs allege that the UTE-RO officials acted beyond th~ scope of authority
:.I

given them to regi;ilate business on tribal lnnd. The authority given to the UTERO officials to
..
regulate business f.n theirjurisdiction derives from the UTERO Ordinance. Whether the UTERO
'>

officials exceedelthe scope of authority given to them by the UTERO Ordinance necessarily

requires examining and interpreting the UTE.RO Ordinance. Interpreting tribal laws is outside
Page 4 of 5
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the scope ofa state district courfs general jurisdiction. "Adjudicatio1i of such matters by any

nontribal court

alsq infririgf!s upon tribal law~making authority, bepause tt.ibal,courts are best

qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.', Iowa Mut; Ins. Co. v, LaPlante1. 107 S.CL 971,977

(1987).
The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. The claims asserted. against Defendants

D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose Construction are dismissed pttrsuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The
claims asserted against the individual Defendants are dismissed pursuant Rule 12(b)(l).

Dated

thi/2( day of March, 2016.
r

BY THE COURT:

SA1'.1lJEL P. CHIARA, District Court Judg_e
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IN THEEIGHTHJUDIC.IALDISTRICT COURT

rN A.ND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
·RULING AND ORDER

Ryan Uresk Harvey~ etal.,

Plaintiffs,

Ute Indlan Tribe'ofthe Uintah and Ouray
Reservation, et aJ .,

Case No. 130000009

)

Defendants.

Judge SAMUELP. CHIARA

\this matter' is before the Court on the Plaintiffs~ Motion to File Supplemental Pleadings.
.\

The :Plaintiffs req~est to be allowed to supplement their pleadings to include eve11ts which
have taken place since the inception of this lawsuit. The Plaintiffs make this request pursuant to
·1

Rule l S(d) of the 1)tah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in part:

Upon motion ofa party the court may, upon reasonable notice, an~ up<>n such tetms

as are just;· pennithim to serve £t $Upplemental .Ple~ding settingfoxfu transactio11s or
occurrences or events which have happened since the date o:r the pleading soughtto
be suppleQ.1ented.

A rule 15(d) moti?fl is•~4addressed to the sound discretion of the cowt. and ..leave to serve.a

stipplerfi.~rital ple~ing ~~h9uld·be iiberally grantedlllliess-good re.asottexJsts·for denyingleaveJ
such a~ prejudice

lo the d~fendants. '" Soulhwesi N,urseries, LLC v. Florists lv/utual /nsurancei

lnc.i 266 F.Supp.
2s 1253~ 1256 (D.Colo. 2003)(quoting Walker v. UnitedParcel Serv., Inc., 240
.
11
F.~d 126811278 (tOth CirM 2001)). "Refusing leay~to amend is generally only jµstified upon a

Paget
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·~·

showing of undue delay, undue prejudic.e to the opposing party~ bad faith or dilatory motive~
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously a1lowed, or futility of amendment" Frank

v. US~ We.st, Inc., 3 F3d 1357 1365 (10'h Cir. 1993).
1

,,
!•

The Plaintiffs' Motion is a clear attempt to bolster their chances of surviving the various
motions to dismisJ filed by the Defendants. The three motions made by the Defendants have
been fully briefed 'and s1ibmittcd for. d_ecision. '11Je Court heard oral argument on all of the

motions on January 29, 2016. Based on the extensive briefing in thost! motions it is apparent
1

1:

that the parties spent a. considerable amountoftime and effort producing them. The Court also
spent a considerabie amount of time and eflbrt researching and revie,ving the arguments. The

~'
<1

Defendants) motions were also pending for an extended period of time. The Defendants
including the UT~RO officials made their first motion to dismiss on May-l,2013. The Newfield.

Defendants made their .tnotion to dismiss on July 7, 201--t The Ute Tribe made their motion on
December 16~ 2015. Attempting to insert new factual allegations into the pleadings after the
i. ~

passage of this amount of time~ after the effort to produce the motions,and hold oral argument,
:•i

would be unjust:. :- .
=t
)-

The Defe0:~ants would be unduly prejudiced by allovving the pleadh1gs to be amended in

effort to defeat their motions to dismiss. The Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit nearly three years
ago. The Defendants have been waiting nearly that long to have their rnotions conside.reg.

Requiring the Defendants to remake their motions~ and to wait longer to have the motions
:..··

l'

resolved, would hq unjust. The Plaintiffs had an opportunity to draft their complaint as they saw
}:

fit. The Plaintiffa\vere given an additional opportunity to amend theircon1plai11t on September
,.(

.

4, 2013. The Plai~ltiffs literally had years to amend their pleadings in light of the Defendantst
Page2 of 4
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motions. Allowing the Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to defeat the pending motions is not

allowed by mles regarding 1uotion pleading, and would be an unjust result.
Neverthel~~s; the ptairitiffs~ Motion is moot. The Court grantedthe-Defendantsi motions,
dismissing this matter in its entirety. The Court provided various reasons for dismissing the
matter, including the fact that the Ute Tribe was a necessary and indispensabl~ party to this
action. Sovereign1immunity applies to the Ute Tribe. Therefore, the. lawsuit cannot be
maintained in a. sclte district court. Furthemwre, this Lawsuit requires this Court to analyze and

interpret the Ute ~ribe}s UTERO ordinance. A state district court does not have jurisdiction over

...

a sovereign, nor

can it interpre.t the laws of the sovereign. None of the factual allegations offered
..
'.1•

by the Plaintiffs changes that result Even if the Court were to allow the-Plaintiffs the
~i

opportunity to amend their pleadings~ the outcome would be the same, The matter would be

dismissed.
A.dditionally, the Plaintiffs' Motion does not explain how the various factual allegations
are relevant, or how they apply to the claims. The Motion is simply a list of the factual
..!, ,

:.\

allegations the Pl~i,ntiffc; allege have occurred since the inception of this action. The Plaintiffs
:1

suggest that the C~mrt examine the factual allegations and dete1mine \Vhich ones may be relevant
i:

in deciding 1he mo_tions to dismiss. The Court declines the Plaintiffs~ invitation. The Plaintiffa'

responsibility is to; offer the facts and explain how they apply to the clah:ns~ and to the arguments
made.
,,,

The Plaintiffs, Motion to File Supplemental Pleadings is denied.
Dated this;.;~.

l;t?

day·ofMan;h, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION

I certify that a copy of the atta.ched document was sent to the following

people for case 130000009 by the method and on the date specified.
MAIL:

A UTAH CORPORATION SCAMP EXCAVATION INC 1555 Vi 750 S PRICE, UT

84501

MANUAL EMAIL:
MAN7JAL EMAIL:
MANUAL EM..Zi.IL:
MA.l\17JAL

EMAIL:

CLARK B ALLRED vernal@abhlawfirm.com

TYLER C ALLRED tallred@duchcsnc.utah.gov
PATRICK S BOICE patrick@boice-law.com
BRADLEY BROTHERSON roosevelt@abhlawfirm.com

MAl'TTJAL EMAIL:

JOHN D HANCOCK jhancocklaw.ut@gmail.com

Ml~.NUAL Et'!AIL:

Mk\7.JAL EMAIL:

CALVIN M HATCH ca1vin@hatch-law.com
CHRISTOPHER .R HOGLE CRHcgle@hollandhart.com

MANUAL EMAIL:

CR11,IG H HOWE howe@millcrguyrnon. corn

MANUAL EMAIL:

RYAN R JIBSON RRJibson@hollandhart.com

MA...o;VUAL EMAIL:

J PRESTON STIEFF jps@stiefflaw.com

03/29/2016

/s/ KELLY SNOW

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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/~w:it1;_,r?it>,.
The Order of tlui Court is stutcd bdow: X .,- '
Dated: May 12, 2016
/s/ SAMl~~

•· \. \,

Districl'CI.'>

· '

09::19:5 1I /\M

lA!

\~{n(\/(:~:::l~•.•

J. Preston Stieff (4764)
J. PRESTON STIEFF LAW OFFICES
110 South Regent Street, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 366-6002
Email: jps@StieffLaw.com

Attorney for Defendants Ute Indian Tribe
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation;
L. C. Welding & Construction, Inc.; and
Huffman Enterprises. Inc.

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY - ROOSEVELT
STATE OF UTAH

RYAN URESK HARVEY, et al.

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

vs.
Case No. 130000009
UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH
AND OURAY RESERVATION, et al.,

Judge Samuel P. Chiara

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the following five motions: (1) the Motion to
Dismiss Amended Verified Complaint filed by the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray

Reservation

("Tribe"),

LC.

Welding &

Construction,

Inc.,

and

Huffman

Enterprises, Inc.; (2) the Motion to Dismiss Amended Verified Complaint filed by
Defendants Newfield Production Company, Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield
RMI, LLC, and Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. ("Newfield"); (3) the Motion to Dismiss or
in the Alternative Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint filed
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by Defendants D. Ray Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock, and Jackie LaRose ("individual

Defendants'l in their individual capacities, and as representatives of the Ute Indian
Tribe, and LaRose Construction Company, Inc., and D. Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C.~ (4)
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Brief, for Clarification of Order, and Related Relief;
and (5) the Plaintiffs' Motion to File Supplemental Pleadings.
The Defendants are divided into three groups, each represented by different
counsel. Defendants Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation ("Tribe"),
L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc., and Huffman Enterprises, Inc. are represented by Mr.
J. Preston Stieff. Defendants D. Ray Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock, and Jackie LaRose,
in their individual capacities, and LaRose Construction Company, Inc., and D. Ray C.
Enterprises, L.L.C., are represented by Mr. Daniel S. Press and Mr. Craig H. Howe.
Defendants D. Ray Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsocl<, and Jackie LaRose, in their official
capacities, are represented by Mr. Patrick S. Boice.

Defendants Newfield Production

Company, Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC, and Newfield Drilling
Services, Inc., are represented by Mr. Christopher R. Hogle.

The Plaintiffs are

represented by counsel, Mr. John Hancock, Mr. Clark Allred and Mr. Brad Brotherson.
The Court heard oral argument on the three dismissal motions on January 29,
2016. Oral argument was provided from all of the parties on each of the Motions. Tl1e

issues were taken under advisement. Pursuant to U.R.C.P. 52(a), after careful review
of the pleadings, the arguments, and the relevant case law, the Court entered four
Rulings and Orders on March 28, 2016. The Rulings and Orders having fully resolved
this matter, the Court is now prepared to enter its final judgment.
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The Court having considered the pleadings and arguments of the parties, and the
relevant case law, and having entered its Rulings and Orders, and being otherwise fully
advised, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

I.

Dismissal Motion of Defendants Ute Indian Tribe
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. LC Welding & Construction,
and Huffman Enterprises. Inc.

1.This matter came before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Amended Verified
Complaint filed by the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
('Tribe'l LC. Welding & Construction, Inc., and Huffman Enterprises, Inc.
2.The portion of this motion seeking dismissal on the grounds that the Tribe is an
indispensable party is joined by all of the defendants.
3. The Defendants move the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Defendants argue this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Tribe
enjoys sovereign immunity. Additionally, the Defendants argue that the Verified
Complaint should be dismissed as to all Defendants because the Tribe is a
necessary and indispensable party pursuant to Rule 19.

A.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

4.Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue. Ramey Constr. Co., Inc. v. The
Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 3151 318 (10th Cir. 1982).

An Indian tribe is immune from suit unless the tribe has waived its immunity or
Congress authorized the suit

Kiovla Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
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Technologies Inc., 523 U.S. 751 754 (1988). In order to waive tribal sovereign
1

1

immunity Congress must unequivocally express its intent to do so or the tribe
1

must clearly vvaive immunity. C&L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001 ); see also Santa Clara v.
Pueblo v. Martinez: 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). "Absent an effective waiver or
consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a
recognized Indian tribe." Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of State of
Wash. 433 U.S. 165 172 (1977).
1

1

5.The Ute Indian Tribe's Law and Order Code describes the extent of the Tribe's
sovereign immunity and the circumstances in which the Tribe's sovereign
immunity may be waived. Section 1-8-5 states:
Except as required by federal law or the Constitution and Bylaws of the
Ute Indian Tribe, or as specifically waived by a resolution or ordinance of
the Business Committee specifically referring to such the Ute Indian Tribe
shall be immune from suit in any civil action, and its officers and
employees immune from suit for any liability arising from the performance
of their official duties.
1

1

U.L.O.C. Section 1-8-5.

The UTERO Ordinance does waive sovereign immunity in

certain circumstances. Section 13.3 of the UTERO Ordinance states:
The Tribe "hereby agrees to waive its sovereign immunity for the sole and
limited purpose of enforcement of the terms of this Ordinance. This
waiver is expressly limited to injunctive and declaratory relief with respect
to the enforcement of the terms of this Ordinance and does not include
monetary damages. This limited waiver is not, and should not be
construed as a blanket waiver of the Tribe's sovereign immunity. Under
no circumstances shall the tribal funds of the Tribal Treasury be subject to
any award for damages.
UTERO Ord.I Sec. 13.3. The waiver is limited to enforcement of the UTERO Ordinance
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only, and is not a blanket \Naiver, or \Naiver for any other purpose. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently interpreted this section of the UTERO Ordinance and held:
Under the terms of that ordinance, the Tribe has indeed 'agree[d] to waive
its sovereign immunity.' But the ordinance explains that this ·waiver is not
and should not be construed as a blanket waiver of the Tribe's sovereign
immunity.' Instead, tl1e waiver exists for the sole and limited purpose of
enforcement of the terms of [the] Ordinance ... .'
1

1

Ute Indian Ttibe of the Uintah and Ouray Rese,vation v. State of Utah, 790 F.3d 1000.
1010 (10 th Cir. 2015) (quoting UTE RO Ordinance). The Court further explained:
1

[E]ven assuming without granting that the defendants counterclaims could
somehow be described as an effort to ·enforce' the ordinance - itself a
seriously questionable notion - the ordinance is enforceable only before
tribal courts and the Tribe's UTERO Commission. Nowhere does the
waiver permit other parties to hale the Tribe before a nontribal tribunal and
this court enjoys no authority to rewrite for the defendants the waiver the
Tribe has written for itself.
id.

6.The Plaintiffs argue the Tribe has waived sovereign immunity by the UTERO
Code Section 13.3.

Consequently, the Plaintiffs argue that a suit against the

Tribe can be maintained.

The Plaintiffs further argue that the basis for their

Verified Complaint is the allegation that the Defendants have acted outside the
scope of UTERO and attempted to conduct illegal and unlawful activities outside
of the boundaries of the Reservation. The Plaintiffs argue the Defendants acted
ultra vires and their claims do not implicate the UTERO Code but are actionable
state tort, statutory, and constitutional claims. The Plaintiffs argue that they are
not bound to prosecute their claims in tribal court or tt1e before the UTERO
Commission.
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?.Whether Plaintiff is attempting to enforce terms of the UTERO Ordinance or
not, the result is the same: dismissal against the Tribe for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. If the Plaintiffs' claims against the Tribe are not brought pursuant to
the UTERO Ordinance, then sovereign immunity applies barring the claims
because tl1ere has been no clear and express waiver of sovereign immunity
outside of the terms of the UTE RO Ordinance. If Plaintiffs' claims are brought to
enforce the UTERO Ordinance, those claims must have been brought in tribal
court. The waiver of sovereign immunity in the UTERO Ordinance explains it is
"for the sole and limited purpose of enforcement of the terms of [the] Ordinance."
UTERO Ord., Sec. 13.3. The waiver "is not, and should not be construed as a
blanket waiver of the Tribe's sovereign immunity." Id. However, as explained by
the Tenth Circuit, according to the UTERO Ordinance, the claims can only be
brought before the tribal court and the Tribe's UTERO Commission. Under either
scenario, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe.
8.Additionally the Plaintiffs argue the Tribe waived sovereign immunity by
1

making a general appearance in this litigation. Plaintiffs' memorandum contained
no authority for this position but referenced the argument contained in a
memorandum filed by them on May 15, 2013. That memorandum also appears
devoid of any legal authority for the proposition that a tribe waives sovereign
immunity by making a general appearance in a case. At oral argument, Plaintiffs'
counsel argued that the Tribe had made a general appearance in this case by
seel<ing a dismissal of the entire case for failure to join an indispensable party.
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Counsel then provided the Court with three cases that allegedly support the
position. Those cases had not been cited during briefing and were objected to by
defense counsel.

The Court allowed the cases in an effort to include all

applicable legal authority to assist it in deciding a complicated case. The Court
authorized defense counsel to file a supplemental response to the three cases
provided by Plaintiffs.

Defendants submitted the supplemental response as

allowed by the Court on February 5, 2016.
9.On February 8: 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that the Court grant
leave to allow full briefing of the issue of whether the Tribe's sovereign immunity
was waived by making a general appearance. It is a mystery to this Court why
Plaintiffs believe they should be allowed more argument on this point. The Tribe
asked for dismissal of the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity in its
motion.

The Plaintiffs filed a twenty-page memorandum in response that

included an argument that the Tribe had made a general appearance in this case
and that it had waived sovereign immunity.

Then, at oral argument Plaintiffs

argued that same point and the Court allowed Plaintiffs to present case law that
had not been provided in briefing. Obviously, Plaintiffs knew waiver of sovereign
immunity in any of its iterations was at issue or they would not have appeared at
oral arguments armed with case law on that point. Tl1e fact that Plaintiffs failed to
fully brief their defenses to the primary issue raised by the Tribe in its motion for
dismissal is inexplicable. There is no confusion on this point. The Tribe claims it
is immune from suit in state court.

The defense to this claim is waiver of
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immunity. Waiver potentially occurs in a number of ways. Any of the potential
ways by which Plaintiff claims the Tribe waived its immunity must be raised by
Plaintiff.

Procedurally, arguments are not made by a series of separate

memoranda.

Rather, all of a responding party's arguments on a point are

expected to be made in a single responsive pleading. There is only one reason
why any further briefing was allowed by the Court following oral argument.
Namely, that Plaintiffs attempted to introduce case law during oral argument that
had not previously been briefed. It was only appropriate that Defendants be given
the opportunity to address case law not previously disclosed before the Court
made its ruling. That necessary briefing opens no new doors to Plaintiffs.
1a.Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the cases belatedly cited by the
Plaintiffs for the proposition that a tribe waives sovereign immunity by making a
general appearance in a case and a discussion of each is had below. The Court
first notes that subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time: Barnard v.

Wasserman 855 P.2d 243, 247-48 (Utah 1993) ("This court has made clear that
challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be
waived by the parties.

11
).

11.ln Friends of East Willits Valley v. County of Mendocino, 123 CaL Rptr. 2d
708, 711 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), under the heading of "[b]ackground" the court
stated:
In a prior unpublished decision we rejected initial challenges to trial court
jurisdiction over the Tribe, concluding that because the Tribe has made a
general appearance, it waived its sovereign immunity.
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Additionally in the 'ld]iscussion" section of the ruling, the court stated:
1

Indeed, the Tribe waived sovereign immunity previously when it made a
general appearance in this case. It also expressly waived sovereign
immunity in connection \rvith enforcement of the Tribal/County Agreement.
Id. at 715. Notably, the statement by the Court tl1at the Tribe had waived its sovereign

immunity by making a general appearance in the case cites no legal authority for that
position.

Tl1us, without furtl1er explanation, that statement carries no weight.

The

California Court's decision is not controlling and because it contains no discussion and
cites no authority, it cannot be persuasive. It is conceivable that the Tribe expressly
waived immunity in its pleadings when it appeared in the case, or perhaps, it sought
some affirmative relief. However, because the prior case is unpublished and because
the published case offers no authority nor explanation for the assertion, the case is of
no assistance to this Court's determination of the issue. Further, the Tribe in Friends of
East Willits Valley expressly waived its sovereign immunity when it entered into a

specific tribal/county agreement that was at issue in the lawsuit. Thus, in the face of an
express waiver contained in the written agreement, it is difficult to determine how much
consideration was given to the issue of waiver by general appearance or whether the
two were one in the same in that instance.
12.Next, the Plaintiffs cite Nushake, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, No. CGC-05441299, 2011 Cal. Super. LEXIS 319, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 29, 2011 ). In
Nushake, the court held that the tribe waived sovereign immunity by directly and

unequivocally consenting to enforcement of the settlement agreement in
California State Court. Id. at **35-40. Nushake's holding, therefore, is unhelpful
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in this case because the Ute Tribe has not similarly consented to enforcement of
any agreement here at issue in Utah State Court.
13.Finally, the Plaintiffs cite United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir.
1981 ).

In Oregon, the Yakima Tribe moved to intervene in a lawsuit under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The Oregon Court held that because
the tribe had intervened in the case it had assumed the status of an original party
and was fully bound by all future court orders. See, id. at 1014. The holding in
Oregon is logical because one who intervenes in a case is seel<ing to pursue a

claim or to defend a particular position voluntarily. An intervenor is identical to an
original plaintiff.

Plaintiffs and intervenors are in any particular case because

they consent to be in the case.

Whether a plaintiff or intervenor they
1

affirmatively sought to be a party. Were the Ute Tribe to bring an action in state
court as a plaintiff, or were it to intervene, an argument that it had waived
immunity could easily be made.

The Ute Tribe in the present case did not

voluntarily intervene, rather it is an involuntary defendant in the action. Thus, the
1

holding in Oregon has no bearing on this Court's decision.
14.The Ute Tribe has only sought to have this case dismissed against it based on
its sovereign immunity. Additionally the Tribe has asked the case not go forward
against any defendant because the Tribe claims to be a necessary and
indispensable party. The facts of this case do not parallel any of the cases the
Plaintiffs have cited in support of their argument that sovereign immunity can be
waived by a general appearance. Nor do the cases cited by the Plaintiffs support
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the conclusion that a general appearance waives the sovereign immunity of a
tribe.
B.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

15.Next, the Defendants argue in the alternative, that the Plaintiffs' Verified
Complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The UTERO Ordinance requires the Plaintiffs to file a written complaint with the
UTERO Commission prior to filing suit.

The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs

failed to do tl1is prior to filing the Verified Complaint.
16.Tl1e Court will not decide this issue.

The Court has already granted the

Tribe's Motion to Dismiss, making this issue moot. Because this Court does not
have jurisdiction over tile Tribe, whether or not tl1e Plaintiff adhered to the
requirements of the UTERO Ordinance in bringing their claims is of no
consequence to this Court. This Court would not have jurisdiction over the Tribe
even if the Plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies. Additionally,
the tribal court, if necessary, is better situated to determine if the Plaintiffs
followed their procedures under the UTERO Ordinance.
C.

Necessary and Indispensable Party

17.Finally, the Defendants argue the entire Verified Complaint must be dismissed
as to all defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) because the Tribe is immune from
suit and is a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19.
18. Determining joinder of a party under rule 19 requires the court to potentially
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make a three step analysts. First, the court must determine whether a party is
necessary. Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734, 740 (Utah 2002). Next, the
court must determine that joinder of the necessary party is feasible. Id. at 7 41.
Finally, if the party is necessary and joinder is not feasible, the court must
determine whether the party is indispensable. Id.
19. Rule 19(a) of the Utal1 Rules of Civil Procedure states in part that a party is
necessary if:
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties. or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
or otheiwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
"The basic purpose of rule 19 is 'to protect the interests of absent persons as well as
those already before the court from multiple litigation or inconsistent judicial
determinations."'

Landes v. City Capital Bank, 795 P .2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990);

quoting 7 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil 2d Section 1602, at 21 ( 1986).

20.The Plaintiffs generally allege the Ute Tribe and the Tribe's governmental
representatives have acted beyond the authority of the UTERO Ordinance and
have committed torts against the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs insist that their claims
do not rely on the UTERO Ordinance but are simple state tort, statutory, and
constitutional law claims. The Plaintiffs claim the individual tribal representatives
acted in their official capacities, although ultra vires, to commit wrongful acts
against the Plaintiffs. Paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of Plaintiffs' prayer for relief
1
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in the Amended Verified Complaint requests that the Court enjoin the Ute Tribe
1

and UTE RO officials from actions that interfere with Plaintiffs abilities to conduct
business. Paragraph 11 asks the Court to enjoin the Tribe and UTERO officials
from regulating Plaintiffs' business activities in a manner that exceeds tribal
aut11ority. Paragraph 12 asks for an injunction against wrongful interference with
Plaintiffs' relationships with oil and gas companies. In part, paragraph 13 seeks
to enjoin retaliation against Plaintiffs.

And paragraph 14 seeks to enjoin

retaliation against oil and gas companies that do business with Plaintiffs.
21.The Court must first determine whether the Tribe is a necessary party within
the meaning of U.R.C.P. 19. The inquiry is whether the Tribe claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in its absence may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to
protect that interest.
22.Any substantive analysis of the Plaintiffs' tort claims against UTERO officials
would require the Court to make specific determinations regarding the ability of
the Tribe to regulate tribal business relationships.

For example, Plaintiffs'

Amended Complaint alleges that UTERO officials told Defendant Newfield that if
Newfield utilized Plaintiffs' products or services, Newfield would be penalized
and/or sanctioned to the fullest extent of tribal law.

Plaintiffs characterize the

Tribe's action in sending the communication as threatening, intimidating,
retaliating, and wrongful, etc. In order for the Court to enjoin UTERO officials,
and thereby enjoin the Tribe, from !:wrongfully interfering in Plaintiffs' relationship
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with oil and gas companies,,: the Court would necessarily be required to
determine whether the Tribe and its officials have authority to give such a
directive to Nev/field and/or to other oil and gas companies.

In essence, the

question is whether the Tribe, througl1 its officials may tell a company that the
1

company may be precluded from operating on tribal lands if that company
continues to engage in business with a particular individual or company.

It

seems apparent that a determination about whether the Tribe and its officials
may issue directives relating to oil companies' business activities, such as the
directive alleged to have been issued in this case, is a critical interest of the
Tribe. Further injunctions against UTERO officials prohibiting them from issuing
1

such directives effectively serves as an injunction against the Tribe from issuing
those directives.

The Court finds that such a disposition in this case, in the

Tribe's absence, may as a practical matter impair or impede the Tribe's ability to
protect that interest. Therefore, the Tribe is a necessary party to this action.
23. However, as outlined above, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
the Tribe, making joinder not feasible. Therefore, Rule 19(b) applies, and the
Court must determine wl1etl1er the Tribe is indispensable. Rule 19(b) states:
If a person described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or sl1ould be dismissed, the absent person
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court
include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might
be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measure,
the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in
the person s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
1
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24.ln determining whether a judgment rendered in the Tribe=s absence might be
prejudicial to the Tribe, the discussion above clearly implicates a probability of
prejudice to the Tribe. Plaintiffs seek injunctions that would require the Tribe's
officials to cease sending letters to oil and gas companies telling the companies
that they face sanctions under the UTERO Ordinance if they continue to utilize
Plaintiffs' products and services. A determination by the Court that tile UTERO
officials' act of sending the directive to Newfield was wrongful is potentially
prejudicial to the Tribe.

An injunction against tribal officials is effectively an

injunction against the Tribe. Such an injunction might limit the Tribe's ability to
issue directives it deems necessary under the UTERO Ordinance and could be
prejudicial to the Tribe's ability to regulate its affairs. Potentially, depending upon
the Tribe's interpretations of its own laws, the Tribe could ban any person or
company from doing business on Tribal ground for any reason.

A judgment

rendered by this Court in the Tribe's absence that purports to limit the Tribe's
ability to sanction or exclude businesses from Tribal property for the reasons
stated in tile alleged communication in this case creates a significant potential for
prejudice against a key interest in tribal self-governance.
25. Next, none of the parties have suggested how the Court could shape the relief
or enter protective provisions in the judgment tl1at would lessen or avoid the
prejudice described above. Neither can the Court conceive of any. Nearly all of
the Plaintiffs' requests for relief ask for injunctions against the Tribe and UTERO
officials. Conceptually, the Court cannot see how it could grant any version of
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the relief requested that would not prejudice the Tribe.
26.Further the Tribe and the UTERO officials are the key figures in this action. It
1

is their alleged

actions that constitute

Plaintiffs'

primary contention

of

wrongdoing. A judgment against the other Defendants, without the injunctions
against the Tribe and its UTERO officials as demanded by Plaintiffs would seem
to be an inadequate remedy.
27.Finally, the Plaintiffs have anotl1er forum to address their claims other than in
the State Court.

Plaintiffs could have raised their claims through tribal

administrative procedures and perhaps in the Tribal Court. The Plaintiffs argue
that the Tribal Court is not neutral or fair. The Court sees such an allegation,
without any factual basis, no differently than if Plaintiffs claimed the State's
district or justice courts were inherently biased against a particular class of
parties.
1

28.The case contains claims which directly involve the Tribe s interests. The
Tribe is immune from suit, and resolving the claims without the Tribe's presence
would impair their ability to protect that interest. Consequently, the Tribe is a
necessary and indispensable party to this action.
29. Defendant Nevvfield has also sought dismissal for failure to join an
indispensable party and that motion is best addressed here. Although similar,
the necessary and indispensable analysis with regard to Newfield does merit
some additional discussion. Rule 19 states that a party is a necessary party if
11

he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
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the disposition of the action in his absence may ... (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
other'1vise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest."
30.Tl1e question then becomes whether a disposition of this action in the
absence of the Tribe would leave Nevvfield subject to a substantial risk of
inconsistent obligations by reason of the Tribe's claimed interest.

The Tribe:s

claimed interest is its ability to regulate business activity on tribal lands.

That

ability to regulate business activity might include issuing directives to oil and gas
companies and imposing sanctions on companies for not abiding by the Tribe's
directives. One potential disposition of this action is that the Court find NeVviield
liable for one or more of the causes of action claimed by Plaintiffs and grant
damages against Newfield. Simultaneously, because the Court has no subject
matter jurisdiction over the Tribe to restrain the Tribe from any action relating to
the directives it sends to oil and gas companies relating to business activities on
tribal lands, and because the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to control
the other means the Tribe uses to enforce its directives, Newfield could become
subject to inconsistent obligations in State Court and before the UTERO
Commission. If Ne\lvfield fails to abide by the directives of UTERO in an effort to
avoid state legal claims that may be brought by Plaintiffs, Newfield may be
subject to sanctions imposed by the Tribe.

Likewise, if Newfield follows the

directives of UTERO in an effort to maintain its status with the Tribe, to continue
its ability to operate on tribal lands, and to avoid tribal sanctions, Newfield may

002057
May 12, 2016 09: 49 AM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM PAGE 57

17 of 35

very conceivably be subject to further civil sanctions in State Court.
31.Thus, disposition of this case in the Tribe's absence may leave Newfield
subject to a substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations. In this context,
the Tribe is a necessary party to the action.
32. Whether the Tribe is an indispensable party from Newfield's perspective also
merits additional discussion. Again, Rule 19(b) requires the Court to consider: (1)
to what extent a judgment rendered in the Tribe's absence might be prejudicial to
Newfield; (2) the extent to whict1 the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3)
whether a judgment rendered in the Tribe's absence will be adequate; (4)
wt1ether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder.
33.As discussed above, a judgment rendered in the Tribe's absence has
significant potential to prejudice Nevvfield. A money judgment against Newfield is
not simply a single judgment. In the Tribe's absence, Newfield could potentially
be faced with a decision to risk further judgments in state court, face sanctions
with the UTERO Commission, or cease its operations relating to tribal lands
altogether.

Because of the potential for inconsistent judgments between the

state courts and the UTERO Commission, Newfield is placed in the untenable
position of operating in potential violation of inconsistent directives from courts of
two jurisdictions.
34. The Court has been offered no solution to lessen or avoid this potential
prejudice and, again, cannot conceive of any manner by which it could create a
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ruling that would solve the potential prejudice potentially caused by Newfield
being subject to conflicting and inconsistent orders from this Court and from the
UTERO Commission.
35.Factors relating to the indispensable status of a party numbered 3 and 4 are
no different in the context of Newfield's position than they are in regard to the
Tribe's position and need not be reiterated here. Consequently, the Tribe is a
necessary and indispensable party to this action.
36.Based upon the foregoing:
1) The Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Brief, for Clarification of Order, and
Related Relief is denied.
1

2) The Tribe s motion to dismiss the Tribe for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is granted.
3) The Tribe's Motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party is
granted.
4) Newfield's Motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party is
granted.
II.

Dismissal Motion of Newfield Defendants

37.This matter also came before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Amended
Verified Complaint filed by Defendants Newfield Production Company, Ne'1vfield
Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC, and Newfield Drilling Services, Inc.
("Newfield").
38.lnitially, the Court notes that based on the Court's decision on the Ute Tribe's
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Motion to Dismiss! this matter is also dismissed against the Newfield Defendants.
The Court found that the Ute Tribe was a necessary and indispensable party to
this action.

However, the Ute Tribe is immune from suit.

matter cannot be maintained against Newfield either.
decision here.

Consequently, the

The Court adopts that

While that decision makes the additional arguments moot, the

Court will address the additional arguments as an alternative basis to dismiss the
Amended Verified Complaint.
39.The Defendants move the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule 12(b)(6)
defense is a challenge to the plaintiffs right to relief based on the facts the
plaintiff has alleged in the complaint. Russell v. Standard Co1p., 898 P.2d 263
(Utah 1995).
40.The court reviews a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to determine whether the plaintiff
would be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of its claims. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P .2d 107 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). The court must "accept the factual allegations in the complaint as
true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Alvarez v. Ga/etka, 933 P.2d 987, 989
(Utah 1997).
41."[T]o support a claim for relief. a plaintiff 'must have alleged sufficient facts ...
1

to satisfy each element' of a claim.·' Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 2013 UT App 26,
paragraph 16, 296 P.3d 760 (quoting MBNA Am. Bank N.A. v. Goodman, 2006
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UT App 276 1 paragraph 6 1 140 P.3d 589).

''[W]hen the pleader complains of

conduct described by ... general terms . . . the allegation of the conclusion is
not sufficient; the pleading must describe the nature or substance of the acts or
words complained of." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah
1982).

11

[G]eneral accusations in the nature of conclusions ... will not stand up

against a motion to dismiss." Heathman v. Hatch 372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah
1

1962); Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, 4 75 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 1970).
42.The Plaintiffs allege that the Newfield Defendants have conspired with the
I
other Defendants to boycott or blacklist the Plaintiffs business. The Plaintiffs
claim the Newfield Defendants are liable for tortious interference with economic
relations, extortion, unlawful restraint of trade I blacklisting, and civil conspiracy.
The factual allegations the Plaintiffs rely on to support their claims against
Newfield are made in paragraphs 70-74 in the Amended Verified Complaint,
which states:
70. Since the March 201 2013! threats by Director Wopsock I the oil and
gas companies, including Newfield, have refused to allow any business
who leases Plaintiffs' equipment or utilizes Plaintiffs' Products to provide
services.
71. By email dated March 22, 2013, Newfield informed Ryan that it would
I
not be utilizing Plaintiffs products or services per the direction of the
"UTERO committee."
72. Newfield's and other oil and gas companies' cooperation with the
unlawful and ultra vires actions of tribal officials empowers said officials
and is the direct and proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs.
73. Since March 20131 Plaintiffs' have lost approximately $80,000.00 per
day in revenues the result of Newfield and other oil and gas companies
cooperating in the unlawful UTERO blacklist and boycott of Plaintiffs.
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74. Ryan has been contacted by oil and gas companies. including
Newfield, and told that they cannot do business with Plaintiffs or work with
anyone that does business with Plaintiffs based on their cooperation with
and support of the UTERO officials.
43.The Plaintiffs also submitted attachments to a Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order which was filed at the same time as the original Complaint.
The attachments concern communications that UTERO had with Newfield
concerning Rocks Off, and Ne\1vfield's notification to Plaintiff that Newfield would
no longer be utilizing the Plaintiff on jobs.
attachments in the subsequent motions.

The parties referenced these
Although foundation was never

provided for the documents, none of the parties objected to the attachments on
an evidentiary basis. Nor did any of the parties oppose the Court's consideration
of the attachments in conjunction with deciding the Motions.
44.The March 20, 2013, UTERO letter notified Ne\ivfield that the access permit
for Rocks Off, Inc. - Ryan Harvey had been revoked. The letter indicated that
companies doing business on the reservation may be penalized or sanctioned for
using Rocks Off, Inc. - Ryan Harvey. In response to the letter, a representative
of Newfield notified Ryan Harvey by email that Newfield would not be using
Rocks Off, Inc., due to the UTERO directive.
45.The facts set forth in the Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint establish, at
most, that Newfield was notified by UTERO that Rocks Off's access permit had
been revoked and were no longer autt1orized to conduct work on tribal land, and
that Newfield followed that directive by no longer utilizing Rocks Off for work on
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tribal land. Those minimal factual allegations fail to support the various claims
the Plaintiffs set forth. The facts do not support a finding that Newfield and the
other Defendants came to a meeting of the minds to harm the Plaintiffs)
business.

The facts do not support a claim that Nevvfield agreed to assist in

harming the Plaintiffs' business. The complaint must give the defendant 'ifair
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim ....

11

Zoumadakis v.

Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., 2005 UT App 325, paragraph 2, 122 P .3d 891.

The

factual allegations made against Nevvfield fail to provide adequate notice of the
actions complained of.

For that reason, and for the reasons listed below, the

Defendant Newfield's Motion to Dismiss is granted.

A.

Tortious Interference with Economic Relations

46.The elements of a claim for tortious interference with economic relations
include "(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs' existing
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper
means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff_:, Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom,
657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants ahave
intentionally interfered with the Plaintiffs' existing and potential economic
relations.)! (Am. Campi., at paragraph 117.). The Plaintiffs do not provide any
explanation of the Defendants: actions or facts to support their claim. "[G]eneral
accusations in the nature of conclusions ... will not stand up against a motion to
dismiss." Heathman, 13 Utah 2d at 268, 372 P.2d at 991. The allegations are
insufficient to provide the Defendants fair notice of tl1e actions complained of.
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Therefore the Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief against Nevvfield is dismissed.
1

B.

Extortion

47.Utah does not recognize a civil claim for extoriion. See Jensen v. America's
Wholesale Lender, Case No. 1:09-cv-169 TS, 2010 WL 2720745 (D. Utah July
8 2010) (unpublished); see also Whipple v. State of Utah, Case No. 2: 10-cv-811
1

OAK, 2011 WL 4368568 *17 (D. Utah Aug. 25, 2011) (Report and
Recommendation) (unpublished) ("Thus, because a private right of action does
not exist in Utah for theft and theft by exto,iion, the court recommends that
Plaintiff's third cause of action [for "extortion"] be dismissed.'} Consequently, the
Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief for extortion is dismissed.
C.

Antitrust Claim

48.The Plaintiffs allege in their Fifth Claim for Relief that the Defendants
conspired witl1 the other Defendants in violation of Utah's Antitrust Act and the
Utah Const. Art. XII, Section 20.

The Utah Antitrust Act explicitly adopts and

follows interpretations of federal antitrust laws.
violation

of

the

Sherman

Act

"requires

See Section 76-10-3118.
that

there

be

a

A

contract,

combination ... or conspiracy ... ; [i]ndependent action is not proscribed."
Section 76-10-3104 of the Utah Antitrust Act requires that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce is declared to be illegal." A claim for violation of the antitrust laws
requires pleading facts showing a concerted effort among the defendants.

In
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Utah, the facts must support "a 'meeting of the minds' on a common 'object or
course of action.Ill Tomlinson, 2013 UT App 26 at paragraph 19 (quoting
Petersen v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, paragraph 121 42 P.3d 1253.

49.The Plaintiffs offer no facts alleging that Newfield and the other Defendants
had a meeting of the minds to boycott the Plaintiffs' business. All that is alleged is
UTERO infom1ed Newfield that Rocks Off was no longer allowed to conduct
business on tribal land, and Newfield relayed the message to the Plaintiffs
explaining that Newfield was not going to do business with Plaintiffs due to the
UTERO notice. The Plaintiffs' claim merely recites the elements of an antitrust
claim. "[A] complaint is subject to dismissal where it does little more than recite
11

the relevant antitrust laws" and the use of antitrust buzz words does not supply
the factual circumstances necessary to support conclusory allegations." Tai v.
Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244 1 1261 (10th Cir. 2006).

The Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for

Relief against Newfield is dismissed.
D.

Blacklisting

SO.The Plaintiffs' claim for blacklisting is derived from Article XII Section 19 and
Article XVI Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. Article XII Section 19 provides:
Each person in Utah is free to obtain and enjoy employment whenever
possible and a person or corporation, or their agent, servant or employee
may not maliciously interfere with any person from obtaining employment
or enjoying employment from any other person or corporation.
1

Article XVI Section 4 states:
The exchange of blacl< lists by railroad companies, or otl1er corporations)
associations or persons is prohibited.
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The Plaintiffs Amended Verified Complaint fails to allege facts concerning the exchange
of blacklists, or malicious interference with Plaintiffs' employment, on the part of
Newfield. The pied facts allege Newfield received an email from UTERO concerning
Rocks Off, and in compliance with the UTERO Ordinance governing work done on tribal
grounds, Newfield no longer used Rock Off as a contractor or subcontractor. The facts
allege that Newfield followed the direction of UTERO by not using the Plaintiff for work
completed on tribal land because the Plaintiff was no longer licensed to do work on
tribal land. The Plaintiffs: cause of action for blacklisting is dismissed.

E.

Civil Conspiracy

51.A civil conspiracy claim requires "(1) a combination of two or more persons,
(2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or
course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a
proximate result thereof." Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, paragraph 13,
275 P.3d 1024, 1029. A civil conspiracy claim also !(requires as one its essential
elements, underlying tort,'' and "a plaintiff is obligated to plead the existence of
such a tort." Id. The Plaintiffs" Amended Verified Complaint does not allege any
facts concerning an underlying tort.

Nor have the Plaintiffs alleged any facts

showing Newfield and the other Defendants came to a meeting of the minds to
commit an unlavvful act against the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' Seventh
Claim for Relief is dismissed.
52. The Newfield Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.
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Ill.

Dismissal Motion of Defendants D. Ray Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock,
and Jackie LaRose, LaRose Construction Company, Inc .•
and D. Ray C. Enterprises. L.L.C.

53. This matter also came before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
or in the Alternative Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Verified
Complaint filed by Defendants D. Ray Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock, and Jackie
LaRose

("individual

Defendants"),

in their individual capacities,

and

as

representatives of the Ute Indian Tribe and LaRose Construction Company, Inc.,
1

and D. Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C.
54.The individual Defendants offer many of the same arguments made by the
Tribe in their Motion to Dismiss The Court adopts its decision on the Tribe's
Motion to Dismiss in as far as the two Motions overlap. Specifically, the Court
finds that the Tribe is a necessary and indispensable party which is immune from
suit.

Consequently, the case is dismissed for that reason, as well as the

additional reasons listed below.

The Courf s decision here will address the

arguments the individual Defendants offer that differ from the Tribe's.

A.

D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose Construction

55.The Plaintiffs have asserted claims against D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose
Construction, apart from the claims made against the businesses' owners,
Defendants Dino Ray Cesspooch and Jackie LaRose. "To support a claim for
relief, a plaintiff 'must have alleged sufficient facts ... to satisfy each element' of
a claim." Tomlinson v. NCR Corp .., 296 P.3d 760 (Utah App. 2013), superseded
on other grounds, 2014 UT 53, 345 P.2d 523 (Utah 2014) (quoting MBNA Am.

002067
May 12, 2016 09:49 AM

ADDENDUM
PAGE
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben67
Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27 of 35

Bank N.A. v. Goodman 140 P.3d 589 591 (Utah App. 2006)). The Plaintiffs'
1

1

Amended Verified Complaint does not assert any facts supporting the claims
made against these two corporate Defendants.

The Amended Verified

Complaint only alleges facts regarding the individual Defendants' actions as
individuals and as government officials of tile Tribe. Consequently, the Plaintiffs
have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against these i'No
corporate Defendants. The Amended Verified Complaint is dismissed pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) for the Defendants D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose
Construction.

B.

Dino Ray Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose, and Sheila Wopsock

56.The next issue is whether suit can be maintained against the individual
Defendants, or if sovereign immunity bars the suit.

The Plaintiffs' claims are

brought against the individual Defendants both in their individual capacity and in
their capacity as governmental officials of the Tribe. The Defendants argue
sovereign immunity applies to them as government officials of the Tribe.

The

Plaintiffs argue that sovereign immunity does not apply because the actions
taken by the officials were outside the scope of their governmental authority.
57.The Ute Tribe's sovereign immunity does not apply to the individual
Defendants acting in their individual capacities. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't

of Game of State of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 173, 97 S. Ct. 2616, 2621 (1977)
C'[t]he successful assertion of tribal sovereign immunity in tl1is case does not
impair the authority of the state court to adjudicate the rights of the individual
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defendants over \Nhom it properly obtained personal jurisdiction.'} In Max~ve/1 v.
Cty. of San Diego, the 9th Circuit considered whether paramedics employed by

the Viejas Band's fire department were immune from suit for actions committed
by the paramedics in their individual capacities. 708 F.3d 1075, 1089 (9th Cir.
2013).

The court held sovereign immunity did not bar the suit against the

paramedics individually because the tribe was not the real party in interest and
1

money damages would not be paid from t11e tribal treasury. Id.
58.The determining factor in deciding whether a tribe's sovereign immunity
extends to the tribe's government officials is whether the sovereign "is the real,
substantial party in interest." Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247, 1253 (10th Cir.
2001 ). Whether a tribe is the real party in interest is decided by looking at the
relief sought.

Id. "[T]he general rule is that relief sought nominally against an

officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 900
(1984). Conversely, sovereign immunity does not bar the suit if the relief sought
is only against the individual tribal officer personally. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 757 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999).
1

59.Here, the relief sought by the Plaintiffs indicates that the Ute Tribe is the real
party in interest. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief against the Tribe, UTERO;
and the UTERO officials. The Plaintiffs request the Court issue a declaratory
order limiting the Tribe, UTERO, and UTERO officials from regulating private
business activities of non-Indians outside of the tribal land. This type of relief
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directly involves the Tribe, not the individual Defendants personally. The Plaintiffs
also seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Tribe, UTERO, and UTERO officials,
from acting in a way which interferes with the Plaintiffs' business. Again, this type
of relief only applies to tl1e Tribe and the Tribe's officials and not the individual
Defendants. The relief Plaintiffs are seeking is against the Tribe. Therefore, the
Tribe is the real party in interest and sovereign immunity also applies to the
individual Defendants.
60.Even assuming that the individual Defendants are being sued in their
individual capacities, and the Plaintiffs were not seeking damages from the Tribe,
the case must still be dismissed. The Plaintiffs allege that the UTERO officials
acted beyond the scope of authority given them to regulate business on tribal
land. The authority given to the UTERO officials to regulate business in their
jurisdiction derives from the UTERO Ordinance. Whether the UTERO officials
exceeded the scope of authority given to them by the UTERO Ordinance
necessarily requires examining

and interpreting the

UTERO Ordinance.

Interpreting tribal laws is outside the scope of a state district court's general
jurisdiction. "Adjudication of such matters by any nontribal court also infringes
upon tribal law-making authority, because tribal courts are best qualified to
interpret and apply tribal law." Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaP/ante, 107 S.Ct. 971, 977
(1987).
61.The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. The claims asserted against
Defendants D. Ray C. Enterprises and LaRose Construction are dismissed
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pursuant to Rule 12(b )(6). The claims asserted against the individual Defendants
are dismissed pursuant Rule 12(b)(I).

IV.

Plaintiffs' Motion to File Supplemental Pleadings

62. This matter also came before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to File
Supplemental Pleadings.
63.The Plaintiffs request to be allowed to supplement their pleadings to include
events which have taken place since the inception of this lawsuit. The Plaintiffs
make this request pursuant to Rule 1S(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states in part:
Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading
setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.
A rule 15(d) motion is "addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and leave to

serve a supplemental pleading 'should be liberally granted unless good reason exists
for denying leave, such as prejudice to defendants.Ill

Southwest Nurseries, LLC v.

Florists Mutual lnsurance Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1256 (D. Colo. 2003) (quoting
1

Walker v. United Parcel Setv., Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1278 (1 Qti, Cir. 2001 )). "Refusing
leave to amend is generally only justified upon a showing of undue delay, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment." Frank v. U.S. Wes( Inc.,
3 F.3d 1357 1365 (1 oth Cir. 1993).
1

64.The Plaintiffs' Motion is a clear attempt to bolster their chances of surviving
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the various motions to dismiss filed by the Defendants. The three motions made
by the Defendants have been fully briefed and submitted for decision. The Court
heard oral argument on all of the motions on January 29 2016. Based on the
1

extensive briefing in those motions, it is apparent that the parties spent a
considerable amount of time and effort producing them. The Court also spent a
considerable amount of time and effort researching and reviewing the arguments.
The Defendants' motions were also pending for an extended period of time. The
Defendants including the UTERO officials made their first motion to dismiss on
May 1, 2013. The Newfield Defendants made their motion to dismiss on July 7,
2014. The Ute Tribe made their motion on December 16, 2015. Attempting to
insert new factual allegations into the pleadings after the passage of this amount
of time, after the effort to produce the motions, and hold oral argument, would be
unjust.
65.The Defendants would be unduly prejudiced by allm,ving the pleadings to be
amended in effort to defeat their motions to dismiss. The Plaintiffs initiated this
lawsuit nearly three years ago. The Defendants have been waiting nearly that
long to have their motions considered. Requiring the Defendants to remake their
motions, and to wait longer to have the motions resolved would be unjust. The
1

Plaintiffs had an opportunity to draft their complaint as they saw fit. The Plaintiffs
were given an additional opportunity to amend their complaint on September 4,
2013. The Plaintiffs literally had years to amend their pleadings in light of the
Defendants' motions. Allowing the Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to defeat
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the pending motions is not allowed by rules regarding motion pleading, and
would be an unjust result.
66.Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs' Motion is moot.

The Court granted the

Defendants' motions, dismissing this matter in its entirety. Tile Court provided
various reasons for dismissing the matter, including the fact that the Ute Tribe
was a necessary and indispensable party to this action.

Sovereign immunity

applies to the Ute Tribe. Therefore) the lawsuit cannot be maintained in a state
district court.

Furthermore, this lawsuit requires this Court to analyze and

interpret the Ute Tribe's UTERO ordinance. A state district court does not have
jurisdiction over a sovereign, nor can it interpret the laws of the sovereign. None
of the factual allegations offered by the Plaintiffs changes that result. Even if the
Court were to allow the Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their pleadings, the
outcome would be the same. The matter would be dismissed.
67.Additionally, the Plaintiffs' Motion does not explain how the various factual
allegations are relevant, or how they apply to the claims. The Motion is simply a
list of the factual allegations the Plaintiffs allege have occurred since the
inception of this action. The Plaintiffs suggest that the Court examine the factual
allegations and determine which ones may be relevant in deciding the motions to
dismiss. The Court declines the Plaintiffs' invitation. The Plaintiffs' responsibility
is to offer the facts and explain how they apply to the claims, and to the
arguments made.
68. The Plaintiffs' Motion to File Supplemental Pleadings is denied.
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WHEREFORE, the Amended Verified Complaint and all claims raised therein are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.

[Signature of Court appears at top of first page.]

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

John D. Hancock
Clark B. Allred
Brad D. Brotherson

Patrick S. Boice
Attorney for Defendants D. Ray
Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock, and
Jackie LaRose, in their official
capacities

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/s/ Ryan R. Jibson
Christopher R. Hogle
Ryan R. Jibson
[Signed with permission of
Mr. Jibson received by email]

/s/ Daniel S. Press
Daniel S. Press
Craig H. Howe
[Signed with permission of Mr. Press
received by email]

Attorneys for Defendants Newfield
Production Company, Newfield Rocky
Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC,
and Newfield Drilling Services, Inc.

Attorneys for Defendants D. Ray
Cesspooch, Sheila Wopsock, and
Jackie LaRose, in their individual
capacities, and LaRose Construction
Company, Inc., and D. Ray C.
Enterprises, L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed
JUDGMENT to be electronically served this 19ui day of April, 2016 upon the following:

John D. Hancock
JOHN D. HANCOCK LAW GROUP
72 North 300 East, Suite A (123~13)
Roosevelt, UT 84066

Christopher R. Hogle
Ryan R. Jibson
HOLLAND & HART
222 So. Main Street, Ste. 2200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Clark B. Allred
ALLRED, BROTHERSON &
HARINGTON
72 North 300 East
Roosevelt, UT 84066

Craig H. Howe
MILLER TOONE
165 Regent Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Calvin M. Hatch
Patrick S. Boice
HATCH & BOICE
1457 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

Daniel S. Press
VAN NESS FELDMAN
1050 Thomas Jefferson St., NW
Seventh Floor
Washington, DC 20007

ii

/s/ J. Preston Stieff
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
RYAN URESK HARVEY, ROCKS
OFF, INC. and WILD CAT RENTALS,
INC.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
VS.

UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH
and OURAY RESERVATION, et al.,
Defendants/Appellees.

Appellate Case No.: 20160362-CA

On Appeal from the Eighth District Court for Duchesne County - Roosevelt
Honorable Judge Samuel P. Chiara
Trial Case No. 130000009
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Pursuant to Utah R. of Appellate Procedure 24 (a)(l):
A.

Plaintiffs

Ryan Harvey ("Ryan") is an individual domiciled in and doing business in
Duchesne and Uintah Counties, Utah.
Rocks Off, Inc., ("Rocks Off") is a Utah corporation doing business in Duchesne
and Uintah Counties, Utah.
Wildcat Rentals, Inc., ("Wildcat") is a Utah corporation doing business in
Duchesne and Uintah Counties, Utah.
Plaintiffs are referred to collectively as (the "Harvey Parties").
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B.

Defendants

The Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation ("Tribe") is a federally
recognized tribe with reservation lands located in Uintah and Duchesne Counties, Utah.
Dino Cesspooch ("Commissioner Cesspooch"), is an appointed Ute Tribal
Employment Rights Office ("UTERO") Commissioner of the Ute Tribe, and is sued in
his individual as well as his official capacity. Jackie LaRose ("Commissioner LaRose"),
is an appointed UTERO Commissioner of the
Ute Tribe, and is sued in his individual as well as his official capacity.
Sheila Wopsock ("Director Wopsock"), is the appointed Director of the UTERO
Commission, and is sued in her individual as well as her official capacity.
Newfield Production Company is a Delaware corporation engaged in the
exploration, development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids
with production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and
Uintah Counties, Utah.
Newfield Rocky Mountain, Inc. is a Delaware corporation engaged in the
exploration, development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids
with production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and
Uintah Counties, Utah.
Newfield RMI, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company engaged in the
exploration, development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids
with production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and
Uintah Counties, Utah.
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Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. is a Utah corporation engaged in the exploration,
development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids with
production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and Uintah
Counties, Utah.
Newfield Production Company, Newfield Rocky Mountain, Inc., Newfield RMI,
LLC, and Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. are collectively referred to herein as
("Newfield 11 ).
L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc. ("L.C. Welding") is a Utah corporation.
Scamp Excavation, Inc. ("Scamp") is a Utah corporation.
Huffman Enterprises, Inc. ("Huffman") is a Utah corporation.
LaRose Construction Company, Inc. ("LaRose") is a Utah corporation.
D. Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. ("D. Ray Enterprises") is a Utah limited liability
company.
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